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INTRODUCTION
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) , the great German philosopher,
left to the modern world a simple yet profound legacy. The
ability to know the sacred and the supernatural, the essence
of Christianity, was beyond human reasoning. The term
"reasoning," or "rationalism," implies a certain
epistemological position throughout this thesis. Reasoning
refers to the long-standing tradition in western culture that
claimed that truth could be measured only by rational or
empirical means. Reasoning discounted faith, wisdom or
inspiration as means to knowledge and relegated religious
belief either to the successful conclusion of a reasonable
argument or to an inferior class of knowledge. The ascendancy
of reasoning as the only path to truth began in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries under the influence of Rene
Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, Gottfried Leibniz, John Locke and
David Hume.
Science, as it became increasingly dominant in modern
thought, insisted upon a certain epistemological method. Facts
and other certain observations from sense experiences became
the norm in forming theories and ideas about the universe.
Realism, empiricism, scientific positivism, and materialism
were philosophical products of the rise of scientific
reasoning. There was opposition to this scientific reasoning
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in
the form of idealism and romanticism. These philosophical
positions de-emphasized the role of facts and sense
experiences and focused on the subjective and metaphysical
acquisition of knowledge. The question of what it meant "to
know" was very important in nineteenth-century intellectual
circles. This thesis broadly deals with this epistemological
struggle.
In light of this legacy, nineteenth-century intellectuals
reexamined the role of theology. If theology could not know
(in the sense that a scientist knows water is composed of two
parts oxygen and one part hydrogen) God's character or
discover his role in the universe, then what was the purpose
or importance of theology? Theology was considered the queen
of the sciences during much of the Christian era, but during
the nineteenth century it struggled to find acceptance and
recognition. The nineteenth century has been called the "age
of science" and it was the century that gave to modern western
culture materialism, agnosticism and positivism. This thesis
examines the broad pattern of theological responses to the
crisis of theology as well as the particular response of the
Christian Reformed Church in the first three decades of the
twentieth century.
There were three major groups of theologians and
philosophers within American Protestant Christianity that
struggled with the relationship between theology and science
in the later half of the nineteenth century: the
traditionalists, liberals, and modernists.' The
traditionalists can broadly be defined as conservative and
moderate British Calvinists who sought to give back to
theology its former status by arguing that theological
propositions could be known using reasonable means. The
liberal theologians were transdenominational and attempted to
redefine theology in light of Kant's proclamation. Liberals
believed that scientific knowledge was reasonable while
theological knowledge was subjective, dealing with morals and
feelings. The modernists deified science and the evolutionary
process and believed that any spiritual discussion was
meaningless and primitive. 2 God and his actions were generally
viewed as identical to nature. Humanity could have ethics and
even religion but they were to be based on natural laws. There
appear to be two major distinctions between the modernists and
the liberals. First, liberals tended to identify a dual nature
in humanity - spiritual and natural. Modernist's saw humanity
as composed of only the natural. Secondly, liberals used the
1 These descriptive labels are not unigue, I must
recognize the works of Ian Barbour as instrumental in the
formation of my interest in the relationship between science
and theology. Barbour is Professor of Religion and Physics at
Carlton College and author of many books and articles on the
broad issue of science and religion. See Ian G. Barbour,
Issues in Science and Religion (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966); Barbour, ed. , Science and
Religion: New Perspectives on the Dialogue (New York: Harper
Forum Books, 1968) ; and Myths. Models and Paradigms: A
Comparative Study in Science and Religion (New York: Harper
& Row, 1974)
.
2 Barbour, Issues , pp. 101-4.
theory of evolution as an example or model . The modernists
used it as the linchpin of their system.
The Christian Reformed Church also struggled with the
relationship between theology and rationality but its views
on the subject introduces a fourth position. It is the purpose
of this thesis to examine the origin, nature, and results of
the Christian Reformed model of interaction between theology
and science. This model, which will be called the
complementary model, envisioned a relationship where
theological and scientific knowledge were epistemologically
equal . It is the contention of this thesis that the
complementary model assisted in maintaining a balance between
science and theology which resulted in both the continuance
of conservative theological thinking and a genuine interest
in the pursuit of scientific knowledge.
The idea that scientific and theological knowledge were
epistemologically equal was not a common philosophical
position in the nineteenth century. The Christian Reformed
system of thought argued, for example, that the theological
proposition that Christ was fully God and fully man was as
rational as the scientific proposition that atoms are composed
of electrons, protons and neutrons. However, equality was not
achieved by arguing that theological knowledge was objective
and scientific, but that scientific knowledge was rational yet
subjective. In a sense, the philosophical system of the
Christian Reformed Church, to secure a place of honor for
theology, insisted that scientific knowledge was not as
reasonable or objective as many believed.
The complementary model was different from those
models held by the traditionalists or the liberals. The
traditionalists disagreed with Kant. They believed that
theological propositions could be known with the same degree
of certainty that a scientist knows the composition of water.
Theological propositions, such as God exists, were reasonable
because they could be known using human reasoning. The
philosophical school of Thomas Reid (1770-1796) , called Common
Sense Realism, was influential in the traditionalist's
response. Reidian thought assumed that a sure structure of
knowledge could be built on a firm foundation of indubitable
certitudes. These certitudes, or first principles, were seen
as the basis for a universal science. These principles
established reasonable proof for scientific as well as
theological propositions. George Marsden, historian of
fundamentalism and nineteenth-century evangelicalism,
described the first principles endorsed by Reid.
Not only did he include states of consciousness, self-
evidently necessary truths, and those things evident
to our senses, he affirmed also that virtually all
normal adults inevitably hold such basic beliefs as
the connection between cause and effect, the general
regularity in nature, the predictability of some human
behavior, the relationship between past and present,
the existence of other minds, the continuity of one's
self and others, the reliability of their clear and
distinct memories, the trustworthiness of the
testimony of others under certain conditions, and the
difference between right and wrong. 3
It was the belief in the universality of these common sense
principles that enabled the traditionalists to argue that
theological propositions were reasonable.
Natural theology, the study of the existence and
attributes of God made manifest to human reasoning through
the works of nature, was an obvious outcome of Reidian
thought. The works of William Paley (1743-1805) and William
Whewell (1794-1866) 4 were attempts to demonstrate that
theological propositions could be known "scientifically" (i.e.
using reason)
. Natural theology tended to put theological
propositions in a precarious position - dependence on human
reasoning and the near-universal acceptance of a set of first
principles. The advent of evolutionary thinking critically
challenged the traditionalist's first principles and their
system of thought.
Natural theology and the entire Reidian system of thought
quickly crumbled in the later half of the nineteenth century,
leaving the traditionalists in a disorganized and defensive
George Marsden, "The Collapse of American Evangelical
Academia," in Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God ,
eds. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), p. 226.
William Paley, Natural Theology: or Evidences of the
Existence and Attributes of the Deity . 12th ed. (London:
Printed for J. Faulder, 1809) ; and William Whewell, Astronomy
and General Physics Considered with Reference to Natural
Theology (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea and Blanchard, 1833)
.
position. Their attempt to refute Kant by insisting that
theological propositions were reasonable and scientific was
foiled by the reasonable and scientific arguments of their
opponents. A fierce debate ensued in the latter half of the
nineteenth century. The traditionalists argued that
theological propositions were reasonable based on scientific
arguments. Their opponents argued the opposite - theological
propositions were not reasonable based on scientific
arguments. History shows that the traditionalist position was
increasingly ignored.
Liberal theologians accepted the basic Kantian premise
that nothing could be known of a transcendent God or the
supernatural through human reasoning. In removing any vestige
of a transcendent God or the supernatural, they redefined the
terminology of traditional theology. God became immanent and
miracles, the divinity of Jesus Christ, belief in the
inspiration of Scripture and any other teaching that implied
a connection between the natural and the supernatural were
modified. Theology became the study of the moral and ethical
dimensions of humanity. Liberal theology, while it played an
important role in defining the moral and ethical obligations
of society and even science, was subjective and its
propositions were not viewed as epistemologically egual to
scientific propositions.
Both views of the relationship between theology and
science failed to give theology its past honor and status.
After Darwin, there were two sets of first principles,
evolutionary and traditional. The traditionalists continued
to argue for the reasonableness of theological propositions.
The traditionalist's view of the relationship between theology
and science lost credibility when the common sense first
principles suddenly changed to reflect an evolutionary bias.
On the other hand, those that accepted the materialistic and
naturalistic assumption of evolution argued that scientific
evidence did not prove the reasonableness of theological
proposition. Eventually, in the twentieth century when the
evolutionary first principles received almost universal
acceptance in the intellectual world, the traditionalist's
claim that theology was scientifically reasonable was
virtually ignored.
The liberal model of the relationship between theology
and science was never viewed as an attempt to give to theology
its pre-Kantian status. Kantian thought ensured the earth-
bound fate of theology. Theology had a high calling, to be
sure, to preach the good news that humanity could rise above
its animal nature by maintaining high moral and ethical
standards. But, knowledge obtained through liberal theology
was subjective and clearly not on the same level of
epistemological certainty as knowledge obtained from human
reasoning.
The origins of the Christian Reformed thinking can be
traced to Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920) , Dutch Calvinist,
8
theologian and statesman. It was his desire to construct a
Christian philosophy and in doing so reestablish Calvinism.
Hence, his movement has been called Neo-Calvinism. He was also
a Kantian, although his use of Kant was limited to furthering
his idea of Calvinism. It was his genius that enabled him to
forge a Christian philosophy out of Calvinism and Kantianism.
It was this Neo-Calvinist system that provided the Christian
Reformed intellectuals with the necessary building blocks for
their complementary model.
Historians of the past century have seriously questioned
the ability to maintain a meaningful relationship between
conservative Christianity and science. Much has been written
on the biased, but very influential, account of John William
Draper (1811-1882) entitled A History of the Conflict between
Religion and Science (1874)
.
5 Draper's account was in
actuality a vitriolic broadside against Catholicism and had
very little to say about the broader issue of science and
religion. In spite of being riddled with historical
inaccuracies, his book became very popular. It was generally
assumed in intellectual as well as popular circles for many
decades after, that science and religion had little in common
John Draper
, History of the Conflict between Religion
and Science. International Science Series, vol. 13 (London:
Henry S. King and Co., 1875). See also James R. Moore, The
Post-Darwinian Controversies: A Study of the Protestant
Struggles to Come to Terms with Darwin in Great Britain and
America. 1870-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979), pp. 19-31 for a detailed analysis of Draper's History .
and were, in most cases, bitter enemies.
A History of the Warfare of Science and Theology in
Christendom by Andrew Dickson White (1832-1918) followed
Draper's Conflict in 1896. 8 White was a historian who taught
at the University of Michigan and served in the New York
Senate before becoming the first president of Cornell
University. "White's Warfare . " explains David Lindberg and
Ronald Numbers, both historians of science at The University
of Wisconsin-Madison:
Did not sell as briskly as Draper's Conflict , but in
the end it proved more influential, partly, it seems,
because Draper's strident anti-Catholicism soon dated
his work, and because White's impressive documentation
gave the appearance of sound scholarship. 7
The works of Draper and White, the anti-intellectualism of
the fundamentalists and the general anti-evolutionary flavor
of conservative Protestantism, convinced many intellectuals
well into the 1950 's that science and conservative
Christianity had nothing at all in common. 8
6,Andrew D. White, A History of the Warfare of Science
with Theology in Christendom
. 2 vols. (London: Macmillan,
1896)
.
David C. Lindberg and Ronald L. Numbers, eds., God and
Nature: Historical Essays on the Encounter between
Christianity and Science (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1986)
,
p. 3.
"Maynard Shipley, The War on Modern Science: A Short
History of the Fundamentalist Attacks on Evolution and
Modernism (New York: Alfred A. Knoff , 1927) ; Richard
Hofstadter, Anti-intellectualism in American Life (New York:
Alfred A. Knoff, 1963) ; and Norman Furniss, The Fundamentalist
Controversy
,
1918-1933 (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1954). It was assumed by these writers, and others, that
10
To accept the conclusions of Draper and White is to
ignore the long and complex history of the struggle to come
to grips with the relationship between science and theology.
The conclusions reached by Draper and White, and the others
who wrote after them, should not be viewed as final answers
to the problem of the interaction between theology and science
but as important evidence of the view of one group of
participants in this age-old debate.
The complementary model of the Christian Reformed Church
was unique in the fifty years after Darwin because it
attempted to treat both theology and science equally. Both
were seen as attempting to discover a portion of the Truth.
Theology, while essentially different from science, was
considered equal in its own right and not because its
propositions could be proved or validated by science. What
was envisioned philosophically also worked in the day-to-day
world; very few problems arose in the Christian Reformed
Church that were caused by conflict between science and
theology. Science was not restrained or feared, but was openly
embraced. Yet, theology was not swallowed up by science.
Theology maintained its independence and as a result the
denomination retained its theological conservativeness. To use
a scriptural metaphor, the lion was lying down with the lamb.
conservative Christianity and science were bitter enemies.
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I. HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN REFORMED CHURCH
Much has been written about the Christian Reformed Church
but nearly all of it has been written by those within the
denomination for in-house consumption. This is understandable
because until the 1950 's the Christian Reformed Church made
little impact on the religious or social life of America.
Since the 1960's, however, the denomination has been in the
forefront of the evangelical movement in the United States.
Many of the leading scholars of modern evangelicalism have
roots in the Christian Reformed Church. But, for most of its
history the denomination was small and insular with a strong
desire for sound Reformed doctrine flavored with Germanic
philosophical thinking.
Insularity has resulted in histories that, while
scholarly, tend to be uncritical in that they gloss over
inconsistencies in theology, theological "civil wars," and
social or ethnic peculiarities so common in any social group.
However, these volumes provide valuable insight into the
religious and philosophical heritage of the denomination. John
H. Kromminga's The Christian Reformed Church: A Study in
Orthodoxy (1949), Dietrich Kromminga's The Christian Reformed
Tradition: From the Reformation to the Present (1943) , and
Henry Zwaanstra's Reformed Thought and Experience in a New
World: A Study of the Christian Reformed Church and its
12
American Environment (1973) represent monographs that are
scholarly but lack critical analysis. 1
Since the 1970's, studies have been made by scholars who,
while still influenced by the ethnic and religious environment
of the denomination, have written from more objective and
critical viewpoints. The major reason, it seems, is that these
authors are aware that they are writing to a larger audience
than the writers of previous generations. Intellectual,
social, historical, and religious analyses of the denomination
are seen as useful for understanding a small but important
segment of American evangelicalism. James Bratt's Dutch
Calvinism in Modern America: A History of a Conservative
Subculture (1984) is a scholarly and objective account that
deals critically with the cultural and intellectual history
of the group. 2 Also, the works of the historian Robert
Swierenga and the sociologist Gary Bouma are intended for
consumption by scholars beyond the Christian Reformed Church. 3
John H. Kromminga, The Christian Reformed Church: A
Study in Orthodoxy (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1949)
;
Dietrich H. Kromminga, The Christian Reformed Tradition: From
the Reformation to the Present (Grand Rapids: Wm B. Eerdmans
Publishing Co., 1943); and Henry Zwaanstra, Reformed Thought
and Experience in a New World: A Study of the Christian
Reformed Church and Its American Environment. 1890-1918
(Kampen, the Netherlands: J. H. Kok, 1973)
.
2James D. Bratt, Dutch Calvinism in Modern America: A
History of a Conservative Subculture (Grand Rapids: William
B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1984)
.
Robert P. Swierenga, ed.
, They Came to Stay: Dutch
Immigration to North America. 1782-1982 (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Rutgers University Press, 1984); Swierenga, ed. , The Dutch in
America: Immigration. Settlement, and Cultural Change (New
13
The history of the Christian Reformed Church begins with
a group of religious dissidents in the Netherlands during the
1830's and 40's, called the Seceders. 4 The Seceders were
initially pietists discontented with the excessive rationalism
and humanism of the National Reformed Church. While the major
reason for secession was the perceived lack of piety, the
Seceders also felt disinherited because the Dutch social elite
had monopolized the ruling body of the church.
Three groups, principally divided by their views on
church polity and their emphases on personal piety, made up
the Seceders. Hendrik de Cock (1801-1842) and Simon Van Velzen
(1819-1896) envisioned a revitalized national church. They saw
potential in the church and desired to work within the body
to create a strong central General Assembly and a unified
doctrinal stance based on the Reformational creeds. Albertus
Van Raalte (1811-1876) and Antonie Brummelkamp (1811-1888)
also wanted a General Assembly but wanted most of the power
kept at the local congregational level, fearing continued
usurpation by the rich and powerful. Van Raalte and
Brummelkamp favored experiential and personal piety over the
Confessional unity of de Cock and Van Velzen. The third group
Brunswick, N. J. : Rutgers University Press, 1985); Gary D.
Bouma, "Keeping the Faithful: Patterns of Membership Retention
in the Christian Reformed Church," Sociological Analysis 41
(Fall 1980): 259-64; and Bouma, "The Real Reason One
Conservative Church Grew," Review of Religious Research 20
(Spring 1979): 127-37.
*Bratt, Dutch Calvinism , pp. 3-13.
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within the Seceders was controlled by Hendrik Scholte (1805-
1868) . Scholte wanted complete local independence with no
hierarchical structure. He placed little value on doctrinal
or confessional purity, stressing instead the conversion
experience and personal piety.
The Seceders became increasingly isolated from the
national church and Van Raalte and Scholte became convinced
that God had abandoned the Netherlands because of its
spiritual laxity, gross materialism and negative influence on
those who were still pious. 5 They began to look to America
because it appeared to offer a wholesome environment for the
family, self-sufficiency and religious freedom. Scholte
emigrated to Iowa, founding the town of Pella. Van Raalte and
his group settled in the Holland, Michigan area in 1846-7. The
Christian Reformed Church began from a small group of Van
Raalte' s people about a decade after the founding of this
settlement.
In 1856, to save his colony from poverty, isolation and
possible extinction, Van Raalte decided to join the Reformed
Church in America. The Reformed Church in America, while
historically Dutch, was viewed as thoroughly American by the
mid-nineteenth century. Many of Van Raalte' s followers felt
that the denomination had absorbed too many of the negative
characteristics found in American culture. They distrusted
5 Ibid.
, p. 10.
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the "American East" and doubted the doctrinal and liturgical
purity of the denomination. The decision to join the Reformed
Church in America divided the colony into those opposing the
union and those in favor of it.
In 1857, four congregations broke from the colony to
"return to the standpoint of the fathers" by forming the
Christian Reformed church." The new denomination did not
flourish, and in 1863 serious consideration was given to
discontinuing the endeavor. This proposal was rejected but
the church was on the edge of extinction for the next twenty
years. In the 1880's, circumstances beyond the control of the
denomination ensured its survival
.
In 1880 four classes7 of the Reformed Church in America
petitioned its synod to make a definite stand against
Freemasonry. When the synod refused explicitly to condemn the
society, many families and whole congregations within the four
classes joined the Christian Reformed Church. A few years
later, the leadership of the Christian Reformed Church
(Christelijke Gereformeerde Kerk) in the Netherlands, of which
Abraham Kuyper was both a member and leader, officially began
to encouraged its emigrating members to join the American
sIbid., p. 39.
"Classis" is a term used frequently in Presbyterian
forms of church government. A classis is formed by a number
of congregations in a defined region. The classis sendsdelegates to a national policy making body, usually called aSvnod Or fiAnpral bccanhhTy o Gene Assembly
16
Christian Reformed Church as opposed to the Reformed Church
in America. The Reformed Church increasingly was viewed by
emigrants as too American, too tolerant of conflicting
theologies and too loose in Reformed doctrine. The Christian
Reformed Church, on the other hand, was known as the haven for
Dutch culture. Reformed orthodoxy and strict adherence to the
historic creeds of the Reformed tradition. 8 Conseguently, the
number of members increased dramatically during the late
1880 's and 90' s, and the Question of survival was finally put
aside. For example, in 1880, the denomination had 2014
families while by 1890 that number had increased to 7573.'
It is understandable, then, why it was not until the turn
of the century that any serious discussion among the
leadership of the role of the Christian Reformed Church in
American society or other broader issues. While the wave of
emigrants in the 1880 's ensured the survival of the
denomination, its leadership was not prepared to look outside
of the denomination until after 1900. For example, it was only
after 1900 that there were a large number of articles in the
denomination's publications on the advantages and
disadvantages of becoming Americans. Also, issues such as the
use of English and the influence of public education on the
purity of children became increasingly important after 1900.
Bratt, Dutch Calvinism , pp. 37-46.
'zwaanstra, Reformed Thought , pp. 5-7.
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Finally, like the Puritans of the seventeenth century, many
of the progressive leaders used the imagery of a divine
calling to instill in their new homeland the blessings and
virtues of Calvinism. Albert Rooks, first Dean of Calvin
College, wrote that one reason for acquiring an education at
Calvin College was to create "most efficient disseminators of
our Reformed principles." 10 Other progressives argued that
laymen should get involved in American culture and society and
thereby assist in its betterment. 11
As the Christian Reformed Church entered the twentieth
century a number of enduring characteristics can be
identified. First, throughout most of its history, at least
into the 1960's, the Christian Reformed Church had remained
culturally, ethnically and theologically homogenous. It was
axiomatic that if a person were a member of the Christian
Reformed Church, that person was of Dutch descent. This
association carried with it certain other cultural traits that
encouraged homogeneity. First, these Dutch-Americans were
insular, preferring to receive a vast majority of their
cultural, philosophical and theological input from Holland
rather than from their new homeland. As James Bratt, leading
Albert Rooks, "Why Go to Calvin College," The Banner .
August 25, 1910, p. 531.
Bratt, Dutch Calvinism , pp. 67-79 discusses early
(1900-1915) attempts by members of the Christian Reformed
Church to enter local politics in Grand Rapids.
18
scholar on the social and cultural history of this ethnic
group, said:
If any group should have "melted" into American
society, it is these people with their northwest
European origins, their nearly Anglo-Saxon lineage,
their Protestant religion and Protestant ethic. 12
Yet, they insisted on separating themselves from much of
American culture and especially American religion.
"Americanization" 13 was resisted until after World War
I because it was viewed as a force bent on destroying the
denomination's Calvinist uniqueness and replacing it with some
form of modernism. 14 While there was a spectrum of opinions
on the dangers and benefits of Americanization, all leaders
of the church feared the effects of rapid assimilation. The
question of whether they were Dutch in America, Dutch-
Americans, or Americans was a question that was hotly debated
during most of this period. Fear of their new homeland was
religiously motivated. 15 Klaas Schoolland, a vocal opponent
of Americanization, expressed caution when he said:
Calvinism [is] in this our new fatherland in great
danger of degenerating, yes, even of perishing. The
spiritual atmosphere [here is laden] with heretical
Bratt, Dutch Calvinism , p. ix.
This was a term often used by these Dutch-American to
describe the process of blending into the American way-of-
life. Acculturation would be a more precise, sociological
term.
Barend K. Kuiper, The Proposed Calvinistic College at
Grand Rapids (Grand Rapids: Sevensma, 1903), pp. 31-36.
Bratt, Dutch Calvinism , pp. 55-66.
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doctrine and human practices in the ecclesiastical
area, and with revolutionary ideas and purely
humanistic hobbies on the broad terrain of Family,
Society, and State. 16
However, the consensus by 1920, accelerated by the fact that
the Dutch were frequently identified as German sympathizers
during World War I, was that they were Dutch-Americans.
English became the accepted language in church and school and
they became patriotic, industrious Americans who found they
fit well into the economic and social structure of America.
Secondly, their religion was another important reason
for the homogeniety of the ethnic group. Religion was their
cultural adhesive. Bratt said:
For Dutch America, theology has supplied the terms,
and the church and its subsidiaries have supplied the
forum, of intellectual discourse. Their cultural
record is hardly truncated on this account, however,
for if there is one thing these people have insisted
on, it is that religion includes all of life, that it
stand as the course and judge of all other human
activity. . . , 17
The church became the heart of each community. Discussion of
theological minutiae was the avocation of even the laypeople.
The official paper of the denomination, De Wachter . was
dominated by theological discussion and application.
Preoccupation with theology created interested and well-
informed constituents, promoted a strong denominational
" Ibid., p. 60.
Ibid.
, p. ix.
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consciousness, and exegesis in De Wachter by prominent
Calvinists in Holland maintained ties with the Netherlands. 18
Also, those that moved to areas other than the original
"kolonies" guickly formed new Dutch settlements or moved to
already established settlements to protect their theological
and ethnic heritage.
The Christian Reformed theology was also homogenous
because the denomination was rigidly creedal. The Belaic
Confession (1561), The Heidelberg Catechism (1563), and The
Canons of Port (1619) were the Reformational creeds upon which
the Christian Reformed Church established doctrine and
determined orthodoxy and heresy. Scripture was interpreted
through the lens of the creeds, it was not allowed to speak
for itself. Strict allegiance to these creeds ensured that
differences would be minor.
A third factor influencing homogeneity was their strong
support for parochial education. This support was largely
influenced by their fear of American public education.
Nineteen years after the denomination broke from the Reformed
Church of America and while the survival of the venture was
still somewhat debatable, the Theological School, later Calvin
Kromminga, Christian Reformed Church , pp. 41-62. In
this section he discusses the widespread interest among the
laypeople in theological problems such as Supralapsarianism
and Infralapsarianism, the purpose of Baptism, and the
authority of the government.
21
Theological Seminary, was begun." The school was established
to provide scholarly ministers and also to prevent future
ministers from being tainted as they attended American
seminaries such as Western Theological Seminary or Princeton. 20
Calvin College was begun as the Literary Department of the
Theological School in 1894. By 1907, the Literary Department
had become a junior college, John Calvin Junior College. 21 The
impetus to keep the denomination untainted by providing
private education began as early as the 1880 's. 22 "Day-schools"
were being established in numerous Dutch-American communities
because the public schools could not be expected to inculcate
a Reformed world view. It was not so much that they felt the
schools were bad or evil, they simply desired to protect the
impressionable minds of their "covenant" children. Schools
eventually appeared where ever there was a Christian Reformed
community large enough to support one. This emphasis on
John J. Timmerman, Promises to Keep: A Centennial
History of Calvin College (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans,
1975)
, pp. 13-45 and G. D. De Jong, "The History of the
Development of the Theological School," in Semi-Centennial
Volume: Theological School and Calvin College. 1876-1926
. ed.
The Semi-Centennial Committee (Grand Rapids: Theological
School and Calvin College, 1926), pp. 20-48.
Western Theological Seminary was part of the Reformed
Church in America and located in Holland, Michigan. Often
ministers did go to Princeton to obtain advanced degrees. To
obtain an advanced degree, after a minister had attended the
theological school, was considered doctrinally "safe."
21 Timmerman, Promises to Keep , pp. 24-45.
22 Kromminga, Christian Reformed Church
,
pp. 134-45.
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Christian education made it possible for the denomination to
control what the children learned, and aided in maintaining
the homogeneity of the group.
Finally, homogeneity was ensured by the limited size and
geographical central ity of the intelligentsia. The leadership,
during this period, was clustered primarily in the Western
Michigan area and Chicago and was composed of the faculty of
Calvin College, the Theological School, and the clergy. 23 There
were less than 250 clergy and faculty in the Christian
Reformed Church in 1920 and most were within 50 miles of Grand
Rapids, Michigan. 24 Since the ethnic, religious and even
economic heritage of these leaders were so similar,
fundamental disagreement was infrequent.
Homogeneity, reinforced by their strong ethnic identity,
the centrality of religion, the importance of locally
controlled education, and size and geographical centrality
assisted in maintaining the relatively fragile synthesis
between Kant and Calvin. The world view and intellectual and
cultural heritage of the leadership enabled them to agree on
many of the essentials of Neo-Calvinism.
Calvin College and the Theological School (later Calvin
Theological Seminary) were the most influential centers of
learning in the Christian Reformed Church during the period
1900 to 1930 and afterward. These school established the
theological and religious tenor of the entire denomination.
Kromminga, Christian Reformed Church , p. 235.
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A second enduring characteristic was the philosophical
orientation toward Germany. While it is dangerous to identify
a particular philosophical tendency with a nation, German
philosophy has tended toward the idealistic, the romantic, the
spiritual and the mystical. 25 Germany, for example, was the
birthplace of the Reformation, the idealism of Hegel, the
romanticism of Goethe, and the vitalism of Hans Driesch (1867-
1941)
.
Liberal theology, with its new definition of God and
the identification of humanity's "godness", found its first
expression in Germany. Even the scientific methods that have
arisen out of German intellectual soil have emphasized
speculation, metaphysical qualities and rationalism. 26 It was
very popular in German intellectual circles, for example, in
the nineteenth century to talk about the "organism of
science". This was an idealistic notion that taught that the
knowledge from the various disciplines, from art to zoology,
were "organs" in the body of science. 27 If one discipline was
25 William Bossenbrook, The German Mind (Detroit: Wayne
State University, 1961) and Ernst Breisach, Historiography:
Ancient. Medieva l, and Modern (Chicago: University of Chicaqo
Press, 1983), pp. 215-91.
26 By rationalism is meant the epistemological belief
that knowledge can be obtained by non-empirical reasoning.
Rationalism stressed the activity of the mind over the
activity of the senses. Rene Descartes is considered the
modern founder of this school of thought.
27 See especially Ernst Cassirer, The Problem of
Knowledge;
—
Philosophy. Science, and History Since Heael
,trans., William H. Woglom and Charles W. Hendel (New Haven-Yale University Press, 1950) ; and Alexander Gode-von Aesch,Natural Science in German Romanticism (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1941), pp. 114-119. Leading spokesmen of
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neglected, the organism, and consequently knowledge and truth,
would be distorted.
This Germanic influence was counter to the dominant
philosophical tradition in America. In his study entitled
Science and Religion in America. 1800-1860 . historian Herbert
Hovenkamp demonstrated that both science and religion in
America were heavily influenced by Baconian and Common Sense
Realism. These philosophies were British in origin and
diametrically opposed to many of the assumptions and
principles of Germanic thought. Empiricism, realism and sense
experience dominated American thought in the nineteenth
century and were still influential in Presbyterian and
fundamentalist circles well into the twentieth century even
though they were of less value to the general intellectual
community.
The opinion held by these Dutch-Americans of the British,
and by logical extension Americans, was very low. They found
the pragmatic nature of Americans difficult to understand,
especially when deep philosophical or theological questions
were involved. The utilitarian nature of the British, many
of these Dutch-Americans believed, kept them from serious
this movement were Johann Herder (1744-1803) , Franz von Baader
(1765-1841) and Johann Fichte (1762-1814).
Herbert Hovenkamp, Science and Religion in America.
1800-1860 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1978) ; and Theodore D. Bozeman, Protestants in an Age of
Science (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1977), pp. 3-31.
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philosophical and theological considerations. They questioned
the genuineness of American Christianity, calling it
"superficial", "individualistic" and "Methodistic. " 2* For
example, one Christian Reformed minister described English and
American Christianity as "very busy," it asked "What must I
do?" rather than "What must I be and then do?" 30 This
difference in attitude he attributed to the "deep" way of
thinking of the Dutch as opposed to the shallow, utilitarian
thinking of the British. This attitude toward British and
American religion was borne out later, in the 1920' s and
1930' s, in their critique of fundamentalism. 31
They steadfastly refused to accept the British
philosophical and religious world view. Their intellectual
heritage was German and Dutch and it was from Central Europe
that they continued to receive philosophical and theological
input. Their philosophical world view was more German than
English or American and their Calvinism was Dutch rather than
British. They looked and acted like Americans during this
29 Bratt pointed out that "Methodism" represented to these
Dutch-Americans a certain type of Christianity. A Christianity
that emphasized the subjective, the emotions, self, and self-
assured. They were not necessarily attacking the Methodist
denominations
.
30 Foppe Ten Hoor, "Bij het Begin van der Nieuwe
Jaargang," Gereformeerde Amerikaan . January 1901, pp. 2-3,
quoted in Bratt, Dutch Calvinism , pp. 58-9.
Joseph H. Hall, "Controversy Over Fundamentalism in
the Christian Reformed Church, 1915-1966" (Th.D. dissertation,
Concordia Seminary, 1974) ; and Bratt, Dutch Calvinism , pp.
131-34.
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period but philosophically they were German. After 1930, many
leaders within the denomination began to accept the
philosophical positions of their theological counterparts in
America. This led some to abandon much of the framework of
their Neo-Calvinist heritage.
Theologically, the Christian Reformed Church was similar
to the conservative Presbyterians in America but the
incompatibility between their underlying philosophical systems
created differing viewpoints on many issues, including the
interaction between science and theology. The Christian
Reformed Church and the conservative Presbyterians were
confessional Calvinists. Ministers from the Christian Reformed
Church often attended Princeton Seminary to obtain advanced
degrees not offered at Calvin Seminary. In 1888, the United
Presbyterian Church invited the Christian Reformed Church to
merge with that denomination. The leadership declined the
invitation but not for theological reasons. They believed, and
rightly so, that their uniqueness would be destroyed and that
they would lose their identity. 32 Finally, the two most
prominent theologians from each group, the Presbyterian
Benjamin B. Warfield and the Neo-Calvinist Abraham Kuyper,
were in basic agreement on the essentials of Calvinistic
Christianity. But it will be demonstrated in later chapters
that their philosophical, especially epistemological,
Zwaanstra, Reformed Thought , pp. 5-22.
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differences caused each group to develop fundamentally
different models of interaction between science and theology.
Philosophical incompatibility was most evident in the
area of human rationality and epistemology. 33 Presbyterians,
immersed in Baconianism and Common Sense Realism, believed
rationality was uniform and that all humans responded to
stimuli in very similar fashion. There was, Presbyterian
scholars argued, no difference in the way a Christian or a
non-Christian observed and interpreted the world. Therefore,
the variable in this epistemology was the "fact". Which facts
were observed and how many were observed became important to
Presbyterians. As appropriate facts were accumulated, the
conclusion would eventually become self-evident. If a person
did not believe God created the world, to use a particular
example, it was because the appropriate facts had not been
presented in sufficient quantity.
Kuyper, and the Christian Reformed intellectuals, on the
other hand, believed rationality was conditioned not by facts
but by the interaction between facts and a priori principles
that categorized sense experiences. Christians possessed a
different set of principles than did non-Christians.
Christians, according to Kuyper, did interpret the world
differently than non-Christians. According to Kuyper'
s
Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith
(Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing
Company, 1955), pp. 261-267.
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epistemology, if a person did not believe God created the
world, it was because his set of a priori principles did not
allow him to see the facts of creation clearly. Kuyper was
intent, therefore, on developing a philosophy and epistemology
that was Christian. These differences were important to early
twentieth century Christian Reformed intellectuals and
emphasize the gulf that separated British and Dutch
Calvinists. And, as will be demonstrated, this philosophical
difference was manifested in the construction of two unrelated
models of interaction between science and theology.
The third, and final, characteristic was the church's
continued commitment to evangelicalism without moving toward
fundamentalism. Evangelicalism, like science, is hard to
define. Evangelicalism for most of the history of Christianity
was synonymous with orthodoxy. Evangelicalism stressed the
sovereignty, love and transcendence of God, the ultimate
authority of Scripture as the Word of God, and the need for
salvation through belief in Jesus Christ. 34 Fundamentalism was
a sub-set within evangelicalism. George Marsden identified
early fundamentalism as:
Militantly anti-modernist Protestant evangelicalism.
.
.
[and] a loose, diverse, and changing federation of co-
belligerents united by their fierce opposition to
Evangelical Dictonarv of Theology . 1st ed.
, s.v.
"Evangelicalism," by R.V. Pierard.
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modernist attempts to bring Christianity into line
with modern thought. 35
Theologically defined, fundamentalism was reductionistic.
Fundamentalists sought to reduce Christianity to its
essentials. Hence, there was a dearth of systematic thinking
in fundamentalist circles and Christianity was condensed into
the famous five points. 36 Historically defined, fundamentalism
grew out of Presbyterianism. Marsden, in Fundamentalism and
American Culture, convincingly argued that the world view and
philosophical nature of fundamentalism was a product of
Princeton theology and patterned after Baconian and Common
Sense Realism. 37 Early fundamentalism was a militant,
theologically reductionist evangelical movement which relied
heavily on British religious and philosophical thought.
The question of whether the leaders of the Christian
Reformed Church were fundamentalists is important because
fundamental istic assumptions of science were very similar to
those held by conservative Presbyterians. Marsden wrote in
Understanding Fundamentalist Views of Science that
fundamentalists were not obscurantists or anti-intellectuals
35 George M. Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture:
The Shaping of Twentieth-Century Evangelicalism. 1870-1 q?B(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 4.
36
In 1910 the Presbyterian General Assembly approved afive-point doctrinal statement. The five points were 1) theinerrancy of Scripture, 2) the Virgin birth of Christ, 3) his
atonement, 4) his bodily resurrection, and 5) the reality of
miracles. See Marsden, Fundamentalism
, pp. 118-23.
Ibid., pp. 11-39, 102-138.
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in their attitude toward science. Rather, fundamentalists
accepted the Baconian scientific methodology and the
philosophical assumptions of Common Sense Realism. 38 If the
leadership of the Christian Reformed Church was
fundamentalistic, then much of what is said about the
Christian Reformed model of interaction between science and
theology in this thesis would be suspect. The problem is
compounded by the fact that superficially, early
fundamentalism and the Christian Reformed Church had much in
common
.
39
First, during the modernist-fundamentalist controversies
of the 192 O's, the leadership of the church consistently sided
with fundamentalists. In the overall battle for souls and in
the struggle to usher in the Kingdom of God, the leadership
saw the fundamentalists as allies. Second, the leadership of
the Christian Reformed Church stood fast on the inerrancy of
scripture. Like the fundamentalists they saw the Bible as the
38 George M. Marsden, "Understanding Fundamentalist Views
of Science," in Science and Creationism . ed. Ashley Montagu
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1984)
, pp. 95-116.
39 John Kromminga noted a certain sympathy toward
fundamentalism among the laypeople. He said, "In seeking to
answer this question [will joining an association of
evangelicals force the CRC to reduce their theology to
fundamental points]
, it must be admitted that there is much
sympathy with and some tendency toward Fundamentalism among
the rank and file of the church membership." Kromminga,
Christian Reformed Church
, p. 118; and Bratt, Dutch Calvinism ,
pp. 131-133 also discusses the various fundamentalistic
issues, i.e. premillennialism, that surfaced in thedenomination.
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ultimate arbitrator of life. Church leaders refused to
endorse, however, the literalism of the fundamentalists
viewing their position as too narrow. Third, they took a very
uncompromising stand against evolutionism, the naturalistic
and atheistic philosophies that accompanied the scientific
theory of evolution. While this thesis will demonstrate that
the response to the theory of evolution by Christian Reformed
intellectuals was very complex, on the surface the leaders
sounded " fundamental istic. » For example, in 1923, Hessel Bouma
(1884-1971)
, minister and theologians, stated:
All real evolutionists are absolutely opposed to all
teleology— I feel this negative point must be
mentioned because it rules God practically out of
existence, wherefore, no Christian can be an
evolutionist.
Finally, even the social temperaments of both groups were
similar in that they valued separation from the world. Their
reasons may have differed but isolation and separation were
seen as means of protection. The Christian Reformed leaders
saw strength in isolation and from this isolation would come
Christian warriors fitted for the service of Christ.
Separation was to be a temporary thing, part of the process
of Christian maturity. The fundamentalist, however, saw
isolation more as retrenchment. The forces of the world were
too pervasive, so Christians had to retreat to survive.
Hessel Bouma, "Evolution and Creation," Religion and
Culture 5 (September 1923) :83.
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The differences between the Christian Reformed Church
and the fundamentalist were, however, much deeper and more
significant than the similarities. Joseph Hall concluded in
his dissertation. The Controversy over Fundamentalism in the
Christian Reformed Church. 1915-1966 . that the
Christian Reformed Church reaction to Fundamentalism
was in the main theological. There existed what might
be termed "core" theological objection.
. . .These "core"
theological objections were that fundamentalists were
premillenial-dispensational, were arminian, held to
hermeneutical principles of biblicism and literalism,
embraced a soteriocentric view of redemption, denied
the present rule of Christ, and therefore were
escapists.
Theologically, no firm bond could be maintained between the
Christian Reformed Church and fundamentalism. Cooperation and
comradery were possible only because they faced a common enemy
- modernism.
Also, it can be added that philosophically the
fundamentalists and the leaders of the Christian Reformed
Church had little in common. The fundamentalists were
comfortable with realism, empiricism and pragmatism. Marsden
demonstrated that even the fundamentalist's method of
examining the Bible was patterned after Baconian science.
Reuben Torrey (1856-1928), close associate of D.L. Moody,
described his biblical exegesis as:
Simply an attempt at a careful unbiased, systematic,
thorough-going, inductive study and statement of Bible
truth.... The methods of modern science are applied to
Hall, "Fundamentalism," p. 218.
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Bible study - thorough analysis followed by careful
synthesis.
Christian Reformed thinkers, on the other hand, found meaning
in the construction of systematic philosophical and
theological systems, speculation, and idealism. The
fundamentalist accumulated facts and in the process formed
theories and ideas. Dutch-Americans surveyed the broad canvas,
identifying patterns and principles, and from these reached
conclusions.
It is true that because of the pietistic heritage of the
Christian Reformed Church and its uneasy alliance with
fundamentalists to battle a common foe, many of the laypeople
developed a sympathy for the simplicity and orthodoxy of
fundamentalism. However, the leadership of the church was
diligent to keep distinctively fundamental istic doctrines out
of the denomination. 43 They were also, in the period from 1900
to 1930, very conscious of the fact that philosophically the
Christian Reformed Church and fundamentalism were separated
by a wide theological and philosophical gulf.
42 Reuben Torrey, What the Bible Teaches: A Thorough and
Comprehensive Study of Wh at the Bible has to Sav Concerning
the Great Doctrines of which it Treats , p. l, quoted in George
Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture: The Shaping of
Twentieth-Century Evangelicalism. 1870-1925 (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1980), p. 60.
Bratt, Dutch—Calvinism, pp. 95-104 describes a
confrontation with premillennialism in 1917.
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Comment must be made concerning the use of 1900-1930 as
the period under study. Any use of a block of years is
artificial because history and ideas do not fit neatly into
pigeon-holes called decades. And especially when investigating
the history of a philosophical idea, it becomes foolhardy to
limit analysis to certain years. In this study, the perioOd
1900-1930 is used to indicate an intellectually formative
period in the life of the Christian Reformed Church. During
this period the church began a college, struggled with
Americanization, and searched for a way to make a transplanted
Germanic world-view thrive in "Anglo" soil. Issues such as the
relationship between science and theology and evolution were
not seriously debated before 1900 and the intellectual climate
changed considerably after 1930. In this study, liberty is
taken to use documents which were written by individuals whose
own intellectually formative years were during this period.
Therefore, articles written after 1930 may occasionally be
used.
A study of the early decades of the Christian Reformed
Church reveals a small, tight-knit ethnic group that was
philosophically tied to Germanic thought. Additionally,
conservative Confessional Calvinism played an important part
in this group's world view. The fact that they were
theologically conservative set them against their
philosophical kin. Philosophically, they were oriented toward
German idealism and rationalism, but their theology kept them
35
from theological liberalism. The philosophical heritage they
brought with them to America, on the other hand, alienated
this ethnic group from the Presbyterians and fundamentalists,
their theological kin. How they traveled a distinctly
different road than those taken by the theological liberals
and conservatives in America and how that road led to a unique
model of interaction between science and theology is the focus
of the next chapters.
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II. THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LEGACY
OF ABRAHAM KUYPER
The focus of this chapter is the philosophical and
theological heritage of the Christian Reformed Church.
Inherent in this analysis will be a discussion of the Dutch
Calvinist attempt to formulate a Christian philosophy and
epistemology by synthesizing Reformational principles and
Kantian thought. Calvinism and Kantianism, brought together
in the Neo-Calvinist philosophical system of Abraham Kuyper,
played an important role in the development of the Christian
Reformed view of the interaction between science and theology.
NEO-CALVINISM
The term Neo-Calvinism was a title given to this movement
by its opponents. 1 However, it was accepted and used by Kuyper
and others within the movement. Broadly defined, it was an
attempt to reestablish the Reformational ideals and religious
world view of Calvin as the basis for religion, philosophy,
science, every area of life. It was also a movement that was
steeped in contemporary German philosophical thought. Neo-
Calvinism was not an attempt to simply re-state Calvinist
Albert Wolters, "Dutch Neo-Calvinism: Worldview,
Philosophy and Rationality," in Rationality in the Calvinian
Tradition , eds. Hendrik Hart, Johan Van Der Hoeven, and
Nicholas Wolterstorff (Washington, D.C.: University Press of
America, 1983), p. 117.
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teaching, but it was an attempt to re-interpret Calvin in
light of modern thought. For example, Kuyper very infrequently
quoted Calvin directly, preferring instead to follow the
spirit of Calvinism rather than the letter.
Espousing theological liberalism, Kuyper graduated from
Leyden University in 1863. 2 He was the quintessential
continental intellectual, acquainted with German theological
and philosophical ideas such as idealism, romanticism and
naturalism. He once said of himself, "I was once a Modernist
myself." 3 He accepted many of the philosophical ideas of Kant,
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) , Johann Gottlieb Fichte
(1762-1814), Hegel, and other German intellectuals. Yet, early
in his ecclesiastical career, he rejected much of this
heritage and embraced conservative Calvinism. However,
philosophically he retained much of his liberal past, later
molding and reshaping it for service in his new religious
world view.
2The following works represent some of the best
biographical sources on Kuyper in English. J. Van Lonkhuysen,
"Abraham Kuyper: A Modern Calvinist," Princeton Theological
Review 19 (1921): 139-147; Justus Van der Kroef, "Abraham
Kuyper and the Rise of Neo-Calvinism in the Netherlands,"
Church History 17 (1948): 316-34; and Bratt, Dutch Calvinism .
14-33. The only full-length book in English is F. Vanden Berg,
Abraham Kuyper (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Company,
1960) . Vanden Berg's book is a popular account of his life.
3Abraham Kuyper, "Modernism, A Fata Morgana in the
Christian World," in The Reformed Principle of Authority: The
Scripture Principle of the Reformation Set forth in the Light
of Our Times , by Gerrit Hendrik Hospers (Grand Rapids: The
Reformed Press, 1924), p. 34. This essay was originally
written in 1870.
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Kuyper's Neo-Calvinism was a reaction to the humanistic
philosophical systems of the nineteenth century, which he
lumped under the title of "Modernism". 4 The French Revolution
was seen as the flood-gate of modernism and the philosophers
of the Enlightenment were its chief prophets. It was against
this spirit of the age, this unified system of thought, that
Kuyper felt compelled to engage in warfare. Kuyper described
modernism as a fata morgana. 9 A fata morgana was an illusion
of great beauty or certainty which if pursued, lured an
individual to destruction. Modernism was like a fata morgana
because, according to Kuyper, it offered illusionary answers
to life's deepest riddles. Kuyper offered this analysis of
modernism's appeal.
In Modernist circles of course our view of
Christianity is considered to be clumsy caricature
not answering to the needs of the heart nor fitting
in with the times.... The heart is too deep, the
riddles of life too amazing as to be disposed of so
easily [by the Christian caricature] . The thoughtful
have perceived this. And so, when Modernism came,
which once more put the glory of the ideal in view,
which analyzed the human heart, which again inquired
after causes, principles and relations, -all this
appealed to the inquiring mind.'
Modernism offered a system of thought that was compelling
Kuyper, "Modernism," pp. 15-35. It should be noted here
that Kuyper used the term modernism to include all forms of
thinking that were hostile to orthodox Christianity. His use
of modernist is therefore broader than its usage in the rest
of this thesis, especially chapter 4.
'ibid., pp. 16-7.
'ibid., pp. 18-9.
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because Christianity had either become shallow or was
perceived as "behind the times". As a result, Kuyper
concluded:
Two life systems are wrestling with one another, in
mortal combat. Modernism is bound to build a world of
its own from the data of the natural man, and to
construct man himself from the data of nature; while,
on the other hand, all those who reverently bend the
knee to Christ and worship Him as the Son of the
living God, and God himself, are bent upon saving the
"Christian Heritage." 7
He felt that such a pervasive world view could only be fought
with an egually pervasive Christian world view. And the most
"decisive, lawful, and consistent defence for Protestant
nations against encroaching, and overwhelming Modernism" was,
in Kuyper 's mind, Calvinism. 8
Kuyper 's Lectures on Calvinism , delivered as the Stone
Lectures at Princeton University in 1898, represented his
mature thought on the nature of his Christian philosophy. 9
Calvinism, Kuyper maintained, was a life-system and not only
a particular theology. This life-system, Kuyper wrote:
Is rooted in a form of religion which was peculiarly
its own, and from this specific religious
consciousness there was developed first a peculiar
theology, then a special church-order, and then a
given form for political and social life, for the
interpretation of the moral world-order, for the
relation between nature and grace, between
Christianity and the world, between church and state,
Abraham Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism (Grand Rapids:
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1953), p. 11.
8Ibid., p. 12.
'ibid.
40
and finally for art and science. 10
Neo-Calvinism, then, was a system of thought that was
thoroughly grounded in scriptural and Reformational
principles. From these principles, Kuyper sought to develop
an epistemology and philosophy that would be a worthy opponent
of modernism.
Neo-Kantianism provided the philosophical background for
Neo-Calvinism. Neo-Kantianism was a system of thought
prevalent in late nineteenth century and early twentieth-
century Germany. 11 Alois Riehl (1844-1924), Hermann Cohen
(1842-1918), and the great philosopher of science Ernst
Cassirer (1874-194 5) were a few of the more ardent supporters
of this philosophical position. It was a reaction to the many
strains of empiricism that were dominant in Europe during the
nineteenth century and that were also hostile to conservative
Christianity.
Neo-Kantians, like Kuyper, were more interested in re-
interpreting Kant than restating Kantian thought. Neo-Kantians
were interested in Kant's epistemological synthesis and its
implications for knowledge acquisition. The greatest
achievement of Kant, and what Kant himself called his
"Copernican Revolution" in philosophy, was the synthesis of
10Ibid., p. 17.
"very little has been written in English about Neo-
Kantianism. See Ralph B. Perry, Philosophy of the Recent Past
(New York: Scribner's Sons, 1926), pp. 145-160.
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rationalism and empiricism into a single epistemology. In
general terms, he proposed that objects conform to the
operations of the mind. 12 Rationalists, such as Rene Descartes
(1596-1650) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831),
believed that knowledge was a product of the operation of the
mind. The mind possessed the capacity of knowing without the
assistance of the senses. In opposition, the empiricist such
as Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873),
believed that knowledge was derived from sense experiences.
Kant believed that the perception of the senses was
meaningless until the mind operated on these perceptions and
created order. Therefore, both rationalism and empiricism were
important components of his philosophy.
Neo-Kantianism opposed the irrational ism of the romantic
period and the emphasis on feelings and subjectivism of
theological liberalism. Radical idealism as expressed by Hegel
and others emphasized, almost to the complete exclusion of the
senses, the activity of the mind and subjective thought in the
acquisition of knowledge. Knowledge was a product of the inner
self and as such did not necessarily reflect an objective
reality. Neo-Kantianism accepted the possibility that
knowledge could reflect objective reality. Knowledge was
possible because of a definite relationship between the object
David Oldroyd, The Arch of Knowledge: An Introductory
Study of the History of the Philosophy and Methodology of
Science (New York: Methuen, 1986), pp. 123-24.
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of study and the mind of the subject.
Neo-Kantianism was also a reaction to the stark
empiricism of positivism and scientific materialism so
prevalent after Darwin. Empiricism, but especially positivism
and materialism, neglected the operation and activity of the
mind. Knowledge of the cosmos was established by induction
from universally agreed upon observations. The subject had
only to amass facts and arrange them in the appropriate order
to gain knowledge. Nineteenth-century intellectual Germany was
a battleground for idealism and empiricism, the two major
epistemological systems in philosophical history. The Neo-
Kantians revived Kant's attempt to synthesize both into a
functional philosophy. However, Kantian thought was only
loosely followed by the Neo-Kantians, being careful to observe
the spirit of Kant rather than the letter of Kant's thought.
It was within this philosophical context that Neo-Calvinism
was established.
Neo-Calvinism can be categorized as "objective idealism"
because it was an idealist philosophy that was anti-naturalist
without being anti-realist. It rejected the radical empiricist
position that only natural objects existed and that knowledge
was obtainable only through the senses. However, it also
rejected the radical idealist position that knowledge was
obtainable only through rational thought. Neo-Calvinism
believed that natural objects were a necessary component of
the quest for knowledge. Therefore, the existence and
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importance of the natural universe was recognized but also the
transcendental, or supernatural, was seen as an essential
ingredient for acquiring knowledge. While philosophically Neo-
Calvinism was Kantian, its Reformational perspective added a
unique dimension. Where the Neo-Kantians postulated only a
metaphysical basis for knowledge, the Neo-Calvinists
postulated a definite theistic origin. Under the influence of
Kuyper, the Neo-Calvinists were able to forge a Christian
philosophy and epistemology by paying close attention to the
spirit of Kant while ignoring many of the details.
Kuyper 's Calvinism provided the rational component of
Kant's epistemology in the form of a world view and a set of
principles. These components acted upon the world of the
senses to form an understanding of the cosmos. Kuyper was
interested in forming a philosophy and epistemology that
formalized this interaction between religious principles and
sense experiences. It is the formulation of a Christian
epistemology and philosophy that we now must examine.
KUYPER' S CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY
Kuyper attempted what few Protestants before him thought
was possible; the formulation of a Christian philosophy based
on Reformed principles. Kuyper stated:
In order to come to a philosophy which suits our
confession, we must with Calvin continue to insist
upon a philosophia Christiana
, i.e., upon a
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philosophy which reckons with God's Word. 13
Etienne Gilson (1884-1978), prominent Roman Catholic
philosopher, observed that the Reformers abandoned philosophy
because of the doctrine of the total depravity of man. If
humanity was depraved, the Reformers argued, then there was
little hope that natural reason could attain to truth, thus
the impossibility of philosophy. 14 The Reformers, and their
theological descendants, did not create philosophical systems.
William Young, Professor of Philosophy at Butler College
wrote
:
History, moreover, would seem to have verified this
conclusion. The Reformers did not work out a system
of philosophy. For them the Word of God seems to have
satisfied every metaphysical need. Later
Protestantism, as we shall see, either fell back into
Scholasticism or attached itself to some form of
modern humanistic philosophy. 15
Philosophy, in Protestant circles, was either viewed as
unnecessary in the pursuit of Christian teachings, or it was
viewed as a universal human endeavor. If it was universal,
then attachment to a philosophical position by Christians was
viewed as essentially harmless to a Christian viewpoint.
Kuyper, on the other hand, saw philosophy as essential and
William Young, Toward a Reformed Philosophy: The
Development of a Protestant Philosophy in Dutch Calvinistic
Thought since the Time of Abraham Kuyper (Grand Rapids: Piet
Hein Publishers, 1952), p. 46.
14 Ibid.
,
p. 13.
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viewed non-Christian, or humanistic philosophy, as harmful to
Christianity.
Philosophy was essential to the Christian, Kuyper argued,
because philosophy:
Is called to construct the human knowledge, which has
been brought to light by all the other sciences, into
one architectonic whole, and to show how this building
arises from one basis.
Philosophy supplied meaning and organization to everything
that was known. Therefore, argued Kuyper, if the principles
upon which a philosophy was built were not in agreement with
the principles expressed in God's Word, the meaning and
organization supplied to knowledge would also be at odds with
the principles of Scripture. Kuyper expressed this thought
when he said.
Philosophy, psychology, aesthetics, jurisprudence,
the social sciences, literature and even the medical
and natural sciences, each and all of these, when
philosophically conceived, go back to principles, and
of necessity even the question must be put with much
more penetrating seriousness than hitherto, whether
the ontological and anthropological principles that
reign supreme in the present method of these sciences
are in agreement with the principles of Calvinism, or
are at variance with their very essence. 17
Kuyper gave full expression to Scriptural principles as
Abraham Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology , trans.
J. Henrik De Vries (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 1954), p. 614. The Principles is actually volume two
of a three volume work entitled Encvclopedie der Heiliae
Godaeleerdheid (Amsterdam: J. A. Wormser, 1894) . All quotations
in this thesis are taken from the English edition.
Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism , p. 194.
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expressed in the writings of the Reformers. Key principles,
such as the sovereignty of God, the doctrines of creation and
the fall, and the reality of sin, molded and shaped the
epistemology developed by Kuyper. Questions such as, How can
knowledge be acquired if humans are depraved? What does
depraved mean? Does the grace of God have any effect on
rationality? What does it mean "to know" scientifically? were
addressed by Kuyper as he struggled to formulate a Christian
philosophy.
Two fundamental characteristics of Neo-Calvinist
philosophy emerged, the antithesis and principialism. The
antithesis, a product of Calvinism, emphasized the reality of
two basic, yet opposing, world views. One world view was
derived from scriptural principles while the other was derived
from non-scriptural, or humanistic, principles. Each camp
established its own epistemology, attitudes, and scientific
conclusions. Kuyper said:
And the fact that there are two kinds of people
occasions of necessity the fact of two kinds of human
life and consciousness of life, and of two kinds of
science. . . (Emphasis mine) 18
Expressed radically, there were two peoples and two sciences
which would ever be locked in mortal combat.
Principialism, an analytical tool used to determine the
root principles of philosophies, theories and ideas was a
,8 Kuyper, Principles , p. 154.
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product of Kantian thought. It was used by Kuyper to identify
into which camp the products of human rationality fell. It
consisted of an elaborate justification of the existence of
life-principles and the subsequent importance of these life-
principles in the shaping of world views, ideas, and actions.
If all sense experiences derived meaning from life-principles,
then responsible scholarship necessitated careful analysis of
these root causes.
The idea of the antithesis was codified by Kuyper and
served as the basis of the popular metaphor of two warring
camps so popular in Neo-Calvinist circles. It should be
emphasized that this metaphor differed essentially from the
metaphor of war as expressed by Andrew White and John Draper
and accepted by most intellectuals during the first half of
the twentieth century. According to White and Draper, science
and religion were engaged in an inevitable conflict because
religion sought to impede the progress of science. Kuyper, on
the other hand, envisioned inevitable conflict between two
principial systems. Science and religion were not necessarily
locked in combat. In fact, science and religion could be in
perfect harmony, Kuyper argued, if they both were derived from
the same principial position.
Henry Stob (b. 1908) , Professor of Philosophy at Calvin
College, provided insight into the Neo-Calvinist idea of the
antithesis in his essay entitled Observations on the Concept
of the Antithesis .
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Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer and Abraham Kuyper
popularized the term, but they did not accept its
Hegelian connotations. Lifting it out of its
correlation with an overarching synthesis, they used
it, not in concert with, but against the then regnant
idealism. They discerned that this harmonizing monism
tended to reduce all contradictions to simple
contrarieties, to erase all boundaries, and to
reconcile all difference. Against it they posited the
view that a vast gulf exists between Jerusalem and
Athens, and that a commitment to Christ cannot be
harmonized with a purely humanistic outlook on life. 19
Kuyper' s antithesis was not Hegel's thesis-antithesis-
synthesis model of problem-solving. Kuyper 's antithesis
posited fundamental and permanent separation between the world
(Athens) and the Christian (Jerusalem)
.
The idea of the antithesis has had a long history in
Christian thinking. Augustine systematically introduced the
idea in his historical analysis found in The City of God .
Calvin used the idea of an antithesis in his embryonic
formulation of a Christian epistemology based on the principle
that humanity was totally depraved. Because of grace bestowed
on Christians, he argued, they were endowed with divine
knowledge not offered to non-Christians. Therefore, Christians
interpreted God's creation in harmony with God while
unbelievers were in disharmony with God's will.
Henry Stob, "Observations on the Concept of the
Antithesis," in Perspectives on the Christian Reformed Church:
Studies in Its History. Theology, and Ecumenicity , eds. Peter
De Klerk and Richard R. De Ridder (Grand Rapids: Baker Book
House, 1983), p. 242.
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However, Kuyper in his attempt to solidify the idea of
the antithesis, went further than Calvin in establishing this
doctrine. He insisted that the antithesis was evident along
a demarcation line between the regenerate and the
unregenerate
. On one side was Truth, on the other was only an
appearance of truth. Herman Bavinck (1854-1921), Professor of
Dogmatics at the Free University of Amsterdam and close friend
of Kuyper, differed with Kuyper on the domain of the
antithesis. Jacob Klapwijk, professor of Philosophy at the
Free University, summarized Bavinck' s objection.
For Bavinck, the kingdom of the truth can no more be
equated with those who have been born again than can
the kingdom of Satan be equated with those who have
not been born again; among the former there is in fact
much error present, among the latter much truth. 20
As a result, Bavinck was less interested in establishing
Christian institutions or insisting on two sciences. He was
interested in investigating unregenerate knowledge and
"Christianizing" it.
Kuyper, on the other hand, sought to establish
"Christian" social and political institution. For it was only
through the influence of Christian institutions that truth
could be approached. He was directly responsible for
establishing newspapers, a political party, elementary and
secondary schools, and the Free University of Amsterdam.
Jaap Klapwijk, "Rationality in the Dutch Neo-Calvinist
Tradition," in Rationality in the Calvinian Tradition , eds.
Hendrik Hart, Johan Van Der Hoeven, and Nicholas Wolterstorff
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1983), p. 103.
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The rigid antithesis established by Kuyper introduced an
epistemological problem greater than that faced by Calvin or
Bavinck. What is the Christian to do with the vast amount of
knowledge that had been generated by non-Christians? Are
Christians to ignore the intellectual treasures of people like
Aristotle, Socrates, and Plato? Kuyper recognized this problem
and reluctantly included the idea of common grace into his
system. Common grace was the grace bestowed on all humanity
which restrained the action of sin, thus allowing knowledge
to flourish. 21 This knowledge, while less perfect than that
which could be obtained by the Christian, was still true and
useful.
Common grace made contact with the world possible. 22
Instead of being suspicious of the world and its
accomplishments, Kuyper saw the world as a flawed creation of
God. To separate the wheat from the tares was seen as the duty
of the Christian scholar. Also, common grace made elements of
human culture, such as law, politics, and science, means of
grace whereby sin was restrained proportional to the amount
of Christian involvement in these institutions. Consequently,
involvement in the affairs of this world became very important
to Kuyper and later to many of the Christian Reformed
intelligentsia.
21 Wolters, "Dutch Neo-Calvinism, " p. 100.
22 Bratt, Dutch Calvinism , pp. 19-21.
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The interaction between the antithesis and common grace
was not clearly worked out by Kuyper. At times, his writings
could be interpreted to mean that non-Christians were
incapable of finding truth. In other passages, he implied that
discovery of facts, apart from forming conclusions, was a
function non-Christians could perform as well as Christians.
In yet other passages, the conclusions formed by non-
Christians in such areas as the physical science were worthy
of consideration by Christians. Klapwijk concluded:
Kuyper took seriously the biblical teaching of the
unbridgeable opposition between what the Scriptures
call "the domain of darkness" and "the kingdom of
God's beloved Son" (Col 1:13), and the possible
consequences of this opposition for the realm of
science and academic learning. .. .On the other hand
one must object to the tangible and massive form in
which Kuyper, also in the field of science, delineates
the religious antithesis and "separates the thinking
minds in the domain of Science into two opposite
battle-arrays
.
Kuyperians within the Christian Reformed Church were divided
and confused just as Kuyper had been. Scripture appeared to
teach total depravity, but day-to-day observation revealed a
great deal of similarity between Christians and non-
Christians. * The obvious tension between antithesis and
common grace was a persistent thread running through the
23 Klapwijk, "Rationality in the Dutch," p. 98.
24 Bratt, Dutch Calvinism , pp. 43-54.
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intellectual history of the Christian Reformed Church. 25 The
antithesis encouraged isolation and separation. The belief
that the rationality of non-Christians was incapable of
finding substantial truth led Kuyper and others to advocate
a separate, and Christian, epistemology. The Free University
of Amsterdam, founded in 1880 by Kuyper and others, was begun
expressly for the purpose of promoting a Christian
epistemology in all scholarly disciplines.
Common grace, on the other hand, kept this Christian
epistemology reasonable. Common grace constantly asked of
scholarship produced by non-Christians, "What is worth
keeping?" It emphasized the fact that the world, human
institutions and rationality were creations of God and,
therefore, had some redeeming value. The doctrines of the
antithesis and common grace constitute the elements of a
checks and balance system that alternately allowed
rapprochement with the world and separatism. Ethnic
homogeneity and the tendency toward isolation kept the
Christian Reformed Church from splintering over this issue.
While Kuyper and Bavinck differed on the manifestation
of the antithesis and common grace, they were of one mind in
Kromminga, Christian Reformed Church , pp. 82-86 gives
a brief account of the Common Grace controversies at the 1924
and 1926 Synods. It was shortly after these meetings that the
teachings of Rev. H. Danhof and Rev. Hoeksema were condemned
because they relied too much on common grace. Bratt, Dutch
Calvinism , pp. 187-203 recounts the ferocious verbal duals
between the two parties. The battle eventually led to a major
reorganization at Calvin Theological Seminary in the 1950 's.
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believing that a Christian epistemology was essential for a
proper understanding of how Christians differed from non-
Christians epistemologically. The idea of the antithesis
necessitated the development of a Christian epistemology and
philosophy. If epistemologies ignored the very foundational
principles of rationality, such as, the Creator/creature
relationship and the effects of sin, Kuyper and Bavinck
argued, then Christians must create an epistemology that does
take these principles into account. However, the philosophical
framework and justification needed for this new Christian
epistemology was not to be found in Kuyper 's Calvinism.
Ironically, it was Kantian philosophical thought that provided
the structure and justification.
Principialism, or presuppositionalism, was an important
philosophical idea to emerge from Kuyper 's interpretation of
Kant. Principialism was the belief that "the determinative
forces of reality were not external or material but the
ultimate commitment of the heart of man, his 'life-
principle'" 8 These life-principles were so important that
they set the standards for a person's rationality. They
prescribed a person's logic and were therefore unprovable and
impervious to logic.
Kuyper argued that human rationality was not objective
and rational, approaching an object entirely free of
24 Bratt, Dutch Calvinism , p. 17.
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presuppositions. Rather, humans viewed all objects and events,
indeed every experience, through the lens of preconceived
ideas. These preconceived ideas constituted what could be
called a world view, or the "commitment of the heart".
Empiricists, such as the realists, positivists and
materialists, held that there was but one correct way of
viewing an object, a person's world view had nothing to do
with rationality. Kuyper, following in the Kantian tradition,
argued that a person's world view had everything to do with
human rationality because the ability to know was a complex
relationship between the way a subject perceived the world and
the objects of perception.
Belief in an a priori transcendental basis to justify
and give meaning to the material world and the active
participation of the mind in exploration of the material world
were important Kantian ideas employed by Kuyper. Neo-Kantians
accepted the reality of categories, or a priori concepts, that
provided a necessary frame of reference for sense experiences.
The world of the senses was formless and without order until
the categories in the mind operated on the sense perceptions
and through this interaction of mind and object created
knowledge. Knowledge, therefore, in the Neo-Kantian
epistemology was a product of passive perception and the
activity of the mind (categories)
.
Knowledge was subjective because it was formulated from
subjective principles of the mind. This is not the same as
55
saying knowledge was an opinion. Kantian thinkers were quick
to point out that the categories provided stability and surety
because they were universal and not particular. But this
epistemology raised to prominence the subject of science. The
principial basis of a person's knowledge, Kuyper argued,
became more important than the accumulation of facts, because
the principles shaped facts.
Principialism formalized the antithesis. Principialism
formalized the means by which humanity was separated into two
camps. Life-principles, Kuyper argued, ultimately fell into
two categories; God-glorifying and humanistic. Each camp
generated its own philosophies, ideas and theories. Principles
determined a person's world-view. The world view acted upon
the sense experiences to create philosophies and theories.
There could exist, therefore, more than one theory or
philosophy because theories and philosophies were constructed
from subjective principles and world views.
Antitheticalism and principialism constituted the chief
characteristics of Neo-Calvinism. Together, they offered the
religious and philosophical justification for a new. Christian
epistemology. The idea of the antithesis demonstrated the
futility of humanist attempts at rationality. The difference
between the regenerate and the unregenerate was not a matter
of degree, it was perceived as a matter of kind. While the
nature of the antithesis and the role of common grace was
hotly debated, there was general agreement that a Christian
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epistemology and philosophy had to be created and employed by
Christians to combat non-Christian philosophies.
Kantian principialism offered much to a conservative
Christian in search of a philosophical structure and
justification for a Christian philosophy. It not only
challenged the assumptions and conclusions of positivism,
determinism, radical idealism and romanticism, it also allowed
the introduction of religious principle as a foundations of
knowledge. While Kuyper understood the dangers associated
with Kant's ideas, Kantianism offered the best philosophical
vehicle for the formalization of his ideas.
KUYPER 'S IDEA OF SCIENCE
Kuyper' s formal discourse on epistemology can be found
in his Principles of Sacred Theology which was published in
1894. The Second Division, approximately one-third of the
book, contains a lengthy discourse on the "Organism of
Science". It is in this division that Kuyper developed his
epistemology. A brief discussion of Kuyper' s definition and
scope of science is in order to aid in understanding why a
discussion of science and its role in the establishment of a
Christian epistemology was prominently placed in a work on
theology.
Science, in the mind of Kuyper, encompassed all attempts
to formally understand the cosmos. Kuyper defined science as:
A necessary and ever-continued impulse in the human
mind to reflect within itself the cosmos, plastically
as to its elements, and to think it through logically
as to its relations; always with the understanding
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that the human mind is capable of this by reason of
its organic affinity to its object. 27
Kantian terminology characterized his definition. Science was
a product of the relationship between the subject and the
object. It was viewed as more than the discovery of facts and
their interpretation, but the result of the "organic affinity"
between the mind (categories) and "its object". Clearly, his
definition of science left no room for the mechanistic and
deterministic empiricism of the positivists and materialists.
Science was also more than the "exact sciences." This
view of science was consistent with the German conception of
science, expressed in the term Wissenschaf t . A scientific
discipline, in the sense of Wissenschaft, was any academic
discipline that formally sought to know the universe.
Therefore, theology, medicine, law, and the arts were all
considered by Kuyper to be sciences. The use of the term
"organism of science" was an idealistic conception that
indicated that all the branches of science must be studied as
a whole truly to understand the cosmos. Therefore, he
concluded, "the organism of science itself must be clearly
outlined, before the place which Theology occupies in it can
27 Ibid.
,
p. 88.
28 Ibid., p. 58.
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To emphasize one or a few of the sciences while ignoring
or denigrating others was harmful. Thus to call the exact
sciences the only sciences, as the positivists and
materialists were advocating, was a travesty that would lead
to excesses and grave errors. Physical science, he feared,
would incline "more and more to announce itself as the only
true science." 29 Also, he believed that the exact sciences
were being drawn away from their intended niche in the
organism of science to be wrongfully used.
This broad definition of science enabled Kuyper to
include the study of theology as a scientific discipline. The
organism of science, Kuyper argued, was divided into five
disciplines that related, first, to a person's understanding
of the "inner or psychial" existence, secondly, an
understanding of "outward or somatical" existence. Thirdly,
humanity studied the relationships between personal existence
and social existence. Fourthly, human life was distinguished
from the life of nature. These, Kuyper argued, were divisions
in science that are unsought and are in "entire agreement with
the needs of practical life." 30 But, he continued:
Now the question is whether, along with these four,
there remains yet a fifth independent part or organ
in the organism of science. And the answer lies at
hand, that a final distinction still remains, even
29 Ibid.
,
p. 209.
30 Ibid., p. 212.
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the distinction between man and his God.
These five "organs" of science, all working together as they
investigated objects, provided a complete understanding (as
complete as humanly possible) of the universe. Theology was
as necessary as biology or physics in Kuyper's conception of
science.
But, was theology to function as biology, were the facts
and methodology similar in both sciences? Kuyper insisted
that theology was never to use the methods or facts used by
the exact sciences. Theology examined God's revealed Word and
as such was grounded in metaphysical and spiritual facts and
methodologies. He insisted that the theologian who "loudly"
proclaimed "that what he studies is science too, forfeits
thereby his right to the honorable name of theologian." 32 In
fact, to allow theology to mingle with the exact sciences had
compelled theologians, Kuyper said:
To cut out the heart of Theology, and to transform it
into a department of study which shall fit into the
framework of naturalistic science. 33
In making theology a science but separating the objects
and methodologies of theology from the other sciences, Kuyper
remained true to the spirit of Kantianism. In his Religion
32 Ibid., p. 211.
33 Ibid., p. 212.
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Within the Limits of Reason Alone . Kant removed knowledge of
God from knowledge obtained by rational and empirical means. 34
God, being supernatural, could not be apprehended using
natural means. However, theology, as the mouthpiece of
religion, was free to use rational means to understand the
character of God. Apprehension of God was still possible as
a religious experience, but theology was restricted to the
rules of reason. 35
Theology, therefore, was a science like any other
science. However, since Kant believed that the a priori
principles of the mind were as important as empirically
derived perceptions, he modified the manner in which the
sciences functioned. Sciences perceived and organized facts
based on the subjective a priori principles of the mind.
Therefore, theories were rational and reasonable if they
followed logically from principles and from a true
interpretation of sense experiences. Epistemologically,
according to Kant, theology and geology constructed knowledge
in a similar manner. Their fact-base may be different, but the
reliance on subjective principles to formulate their
respective knowledge was the same. Theology was a science, not
Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason
Alone (New York: Harper, 1960)
.
Karl Barth, Protestant Thought: From Rousseau to
Ritschl. being the Translation of Eleven Chapters of Die
Protestantische Theologie . trans. Brian Cozens (New York:
Harper Bros., 1959; reprint ed., Newport, New York: Books for
Libraries Press, 1971), pp. 150-169.
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because it was empirical like the exact sciences, but because
all sciences were equally subjective. Kuyper was convinced
of the subjectivity of science. This was demonstrated when he
argued:
you see different men, who from their point of view
are honest in their purposes, and whose talents for
investigation are fairly equal, arrive at as many
different and sometimes directly opposite results.
This subjectivity, Kuyper observed, was less prevalent in
those areas of science that examined "pure matter" and more
obvious in those sciences that investigate the "non-material
domain of life." 37 However, he believed strongly that the
empiricist's claim that knowledge resulted from the
accumulation of facts was naive and did not coincide with
reality.
Science was subjective because of the complex interaction
of the subject (observer) and the object and because of the
reality of sin. Here, the synthesis so prevalent in Kuyper's
Neo-Calvinism, is seen. The Kantian notion of categories and
the Reformational principle of the real effect of sin on
rationality are used to justify the proposition that science
was subjective.
Kuyper postulated an organic relationship between the
subject and object. To understand an object, that is to
38 Kuyper, Principles , p. 116.
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understand the complex relationship between that object and
other objects, required the active participation of the
subject's mind. Kuyper said,
In the same way the object must remain unknown to me,
even though I am in contact with it by numberless
relations, as long as in my consciousness the
possibility is not given of apperceiving it in
relation to my personal self. 38
A little further in the paragraph, he emphasized this point
again when he discussed the futility of a color-blind person
to understand a painting.
There is, therefore, no perception or observation
possible, unless there is a receptivity for the object
in our human consciousness, which enables our
consciousness to grasp it after its nature and form. 39
The active participation of the subject, Kuyper argued, was
essential in scientific discoveries.
The Reformational idea of sin was also used by Kuyper to
argue for the subjectivity of science. Kuyper argued that
taking into account the effects of sin was essential for a
correct understanding of the cosmos. He said:
Truly the entire interpretation of science... is in an
absolute sense governed by the question whether or no
a disturbance has been brought about by sin either in
the object or in the subject of science. 40
Sin affected both the subject and the object and it was only
38 Ibid., p. 71.
40 Ibid.
,
p. 92.
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when this effect was recognized that science could move a
little closer to the harmony that existed before the Fall.
Obviously, in constructing his Christian epistemology,
Kuyper went beyond the standard theological definition of sin.
Sin, in Kuyper's thinking, resulted in more than alienation
from God. The effects of sin went beyond even the moral and
ethical, although these are included in Kuyper's philosophy.
Sin reached even into the world of objects and rationality,
corrupting the perceptions and observations as well as putting
physical constraints on the subject of science. Sin, according
to Kuyper, was responsible for mistakes, self-deception,
delusion, and bias. And, as long as there was sin, there would
be disharmony with the cosmos. This disharmony would result
in differing views on the nature of, and relationships
between, natural objects.
Science, Kuyper concluded, was an attempt by sinful
humans to model reality based on the active participation of
the mind. As such, science was subject to the foibles of human
nature and the best it could attain was a close approximation
to the way the cosmos really works. In this, Kuyper's view of
science was in line with many of the philosophies of science
introduced since the turn of the twentieth century that
Ibid., p. 90. In this passage Kuyper paints a picture
of what life would have been like before the Fall, "...as we
ourselves are a part of that cosmos, we should have, with an
ever-increasing clearness of consciousness, lived the life of
that cosmos along with it, any by our life itself we should
have ruled it."
stressed the uncertainty of science and its dependence on
societal and psychological perceptions. 42
Empiricists have voiced serious apprehension about making
knowledge dependent on psychology or society. If knowledge was
based on the perceptions of individuals or groups of
individuals, the empiricist argued, then knowledge was
relative and any attempt at systematizing knowledge was
impossible. This argument was used principally by Baconians
and Common Sense Realists. Kuyper refuted the claims of the
realists by demonstrating that while science was subjective,
knowledge obtained from science reflected reality.
Kuyper believed, like Kant, that there was an organic
relationship between the subject and object thus ensuring the
ability to know. The capability to discover order, continuity
and constancy in the cosmos was proof that the inner world of
thought was designed to be receptive to see these relations.
Kuyper said:
Our thinking does not confine itself exclusively to
playing the part of the observer of relations, which
42 Karl Popper was a pioneer in moving away from logical
positivism and strict empiricism. His notion of falsification
involved social and psychological decisions. Karl Popper, The
Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Basic Books, 1959)
.
Thomas S. Kuhn and Imre Lakatos are both recent philosophers
of science who study the structure of scientific theories and
the processes whereby one theory or paradigm gives way to
another. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) and
Imre Lakatos, "Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific
Research Programmes," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
69 (1968): 149-186. For an excellent discussion of 'science
as a dynamic social system' see Oldroyd, The Arch of
Knowledge .
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is always more or less passive, but also carries in
itself an active power. This active power roots in
the fact... that before we become aware of these
relations outside of use, the setting for them is
present in our own consciousness. (Emphasis mine)
This relationship ensured that what was observed would not be
radically different over time or from person to person.
This relationship was given supernatural surety when he
concluded that this organic relationship was a product of a
force outside the cosmos. This force he recognized as God,
the "Original Subject". When the subject discovered the
intricacies of the cosmos, to use the words of Kuyper, he was:
Thinking the thought over again, by which the Subject
(God) defined these relations when he called them into
being.
Therefore, God, in Kuyper's epistemology, was the author of
the subject (categories)
, object and the relationships
discovered by the subject. Therefore, that which was
discovered could be assumed to be reliable, and not relative,
because the ability to understand relationships came from God.
Aside from God as the supreme Subject/Creator, wisdom
and faith were practical arguments against the realists
accusations. Wisdom was that type of thinking, according to
Kuyper, Principles
,
p. 77.
44 Ibid., p. 78.
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Kuyper, which is practical, intuitive, and in harmony with
the reality of the cosmos. Wisdom, Kuyper said:
Is the damning evidence against the skeptics [because
it] is a path to knowing other than through the senses
and empiricism and through this path knowledge in the
cosmos can be derived.
Wisdom was subjective and could never supercede discursive
thought, he argued,
Nor can it take the place of empiricism, but it has
the general universal tendency to exclude follies
from the processes of discursive thought, and in
empirical investigation to promote the accuracy of
our tact. (Emphasis mine) **
Kuyper likened wisdom to common sense, the ability to get at
the root of the matter and from there use rationalism and
empiricism to approach the truth.
Faith, according to Kuyper, was "the means or instrument
by which to possess certainty." 47 Faith allowed the scientist
to believe that what the senses were observing was indeed
being perceived by the conscience. Wisdom and faith, according
to Kuyper, attested to the ability of the subject to
understand the reality of the cosmos. Even in the exact
sciences, he said:
There is no investigation, nor any conclusion
conceivable except in so far as the observation in
the investigation and reasoning in the conclusion are
45 Ibid., p. 123.
46 Ibid., p. 124.
47 Ibid., p. 131.
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grounded in faith.
Science, Kuyper argued, was not the monolithic monument
to objectivity claimed by the empiricists. Science, instead,
was a quest for truth which was punctuated by error, false
starts, petty biases, and fundamental differences. The results
of science were also influenced by the unlimited pattern of
perceptions that were carried by each investigator. That
knowledge was even possible and progress made was due to the
organic affinity of the subject and object that was placed
there by God, and by the reliance on faith and wisdom. Science
was not truth, science was not even objective. Science only
sought truth and was guided by the principles and world views
of its practitioners.
All sciences were subjective in that they relied on
faith, wisdom, and a priori principles. Theological
propositions, if allowed to flow rationally from these sources
of knowledge, were seen by Kuyper to be as valid as any
proposition devised in the exact sciences. Epistemologically,
there were no differences between theology and any other
science.
From his observation that all sciences were subjective
and epistemologically equal, Kuyper proceeded to his final
point, namely, that science interpreted in the light of
Christian principles was more valid as the science produced
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by materialistic principles. Since interpretations and
theories were based on subjective analyses, there could be
more than one system of science. In fact, Kuyper claimed there
were exactly two systems, the science of the regenerate and
the science of the unregenerate. The science of the regenerate
assumed Christian principles and from these were developed a
philosophy and epistemology that produced certain scientific
conclusions. Similarly, the science of the unregenerate
assumed certain principles. But these principles were human-
centered, and produced a philosophy, epistemology and
scientific conclusions that were contrary to those of the
regenerate.
Each subject operated from a set of principles, Kuyper
argued. There were two fundamental sets of antithetical
principles which in turn determined how an individual would
structure scientific conclusions. It should be emphasized that
normal differences and disagreements between scientists were
not the issue here. Kuyper recognized that most differences
are the result of poor observation, ignorance of facts and
varying degrees of intellectual ability. There was a
difference, however, that went far deeper than different
abilities or human error. Kuyper wrote:
In this multiformity there operates a law.
.. [that]
causes the radically stronger and purer expressions
to dominate the weaker. . . .But this naturally all falls
away when you encounter a difference of principle, and
when you come to deal with two kinds of people, i.e.
with those who part company because of a difference
which does not find its origin within the circle of
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our human consciousness, but outside of it.
There was a fundamental difference, Kuyper maintained, between
Christians and non-Christians. And the principles held by each
group were expressed in the conclusions of their respective
sciences.
Expressed epistemologically, the ability "to know" was
in direct proportion to a person's proximity to scriptural
principles. If God was the author of all knowledge, then those
individuals who come closest to thinking God's thoughts would
be closer to apprehending the Truth. The correspondence
between God's thoughts and human apprehension of these
thoughts was expressed by Kuyper when he said:
He who aims at anything but the study of the organic
world of thought that lies in the cosmos, until his
own world of thought entirely corresponds to it, is
no man of science but a scientifical adventurer.
(Emphasis mine)
The philosophy that was grounded in an epistemology that used
scriptural principles would produce a science that was
qualitatively superior to one that did not use these
principles. A Christian epistemology and philosophy was
essential if a true account of the cosmos was to be obtained.
Kuyper made great strides in producing a Christian
philosophy. His philosophy was a well-reasoned and logical
Ibid., p. 151-2.
50 Ibid., p. 78.
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alternative to the idealistic, materialistic and positivistic
philosophies of the day. That it was based on principles and
a world view that were deemed archaic and useless by most
nineteenth and twentieth-century philosophers only reinforced
Kuyper's belief in the antithesis and in the validity of his
system.
It is understandable that the impact of his philosophical
system was minimal. British Calvinists, while perhaps agreeing
with Kuyper's world view and Reformational principles, were
uncomfortable with his idealism and views on rationality.
Other Protestant were uncomfortable with both his
Reformational principles and his idealism and epistemology.
Secular philosophers could possibly accept his idealism but
not his principles. Others have followed in the footsteps of
Kuyper and Bavinck, but the philosophical system seems to be
limited to Dutch Calvinists. 51
Kuyper's Christian philosophy and views on rationality
were destined to remain unpopular. The idea that spiritual
rebirth effected rationality was hard to accept, even by other
Christians. In democratic America, Kuyper's philosophy
collided with the notion of equality. Any endeavor to improve
Kuyper's idea of a Christian philosophy was abandoned in
See Wolters, "Dutch Neo-Calvinism" ; and Young, Toward
a Reformed Philosophy for information on Neo-Calvinists who
followed in the footsteps of Kuyper and Bavinck. The list
includes Jan Woltjer, W. Geesink, D.H.T. Vollenhoven and
Herman Dooyeweerd.
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America. No systematic attempt to add to Kuyper's work was
evident in America during the first half of the twentieth
century. However, there were a number of enduring
characteristics of Kuyper's philosophy and epistemology that
were used extensively by the Christian Reformed Church.
Principial analysis became an essential tool in the
church's arsenal of defense. They were very aware that people
did not approach a subject free of preconceived ideas and
assumptions. Every statement, observation, and theory was seen
as loaded with epistemological baggage. It was, therefore, the
responsibility of any thinking person, but especially
Christians, to identify the nature of underlying principles.
In so doing, a person would be in a better position to know
how to respond to philosophies and ideas. There were abuses
of principial ism and in many cases principial analysis was
employed irresponsibly to condemn threatening ideas. But, as
James Bratt said, Kuyper's principial analysis demonstrated,
that reason was the servant of the heart; that no
intellectual activity, including the natural sciences,
was impartial or value-free or without
presuppositions; and that every social organization
operated according to and in the interests of an
ideology - and this in an age when such contentions
were consistently ignored or denied. 52
Closely related to principial ism was the idea of the
antithesis. The idea of the antithesis motivated the
52 Bratt, Dutch Calvinism , p. 18.
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denomination for Christian action but also was responsible
for much stereotypical thinking. It was responsible for the
creation of Kuyper's Christian epistemology and his interest
in founding social, political and academic institutions.
Later, in America, the antithesis was a driving force in the
establishment of Christian day-schools and Calvin College.
These institutions and accompanying epistemology were
necessary to rescue lost souls and assist in the redemption
of the cosmos. Unfortunately, not all the effects of the
antithesis were this noble. Often the antithesis became an
excuse for lazy thinking. Issues were often seen as black and
white, good or evil. However, few, if any, of the leaders
discussed in the next chapter used the antithesis in this
fashion.
Kuyper's discourse on the nature of science and the place
of theology in the sciences made an impact on the leadership
in the Christian Reformed Church. The issue of the
epistemological equality of theology and the exact sciences
was used frequently by churchmen. The relationship between
theology and science was worked out to a very great extent by
Kuyper. It remains to be seen what the Christian Reformed
Church did with Kuyper's philosophy and epistemology.
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III. THE COMPLEMENTARY MODEL
Kuyper's philosophy and supporting epistemology were
closely followed by members of the Christian Reformed Church.
There was much written during the period from 1900 to 1930
about the antithesis, principles, common grace, and the unity
of truth. However, there was very little interest during this
period in continuing Kuyper's work of systematizing a
Christian philosophy. The church's intelligentsia for the most
part was content to simply interpret their situation in light
of what Kuyper had written. As the model of interaction
between science and theology is discussed, it will become
evident that the church leaders were followers and not
innovators.
During these turbulent decades, when American
denominations struggled with the ever-changing role and
importance of theology and science, the Christian Reformed
Church remained relatively free of this conflict. There was
not the fear of science, or worse, the anti-intellectualism
so often displayed in fundamentalist circles. There were no
schisms or major confrontations in the college and seminary
over the issue of evolution or science. Conservative
theological thinking remained dominant and unopposed. Theology
became neither reactionary nor conciliatory toward science.
Conspicuously lacking during this period were the debates
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about the importance and function of theology and science so
prevalent in other American denominations.
A conclusion that could be drawn is that the denomination
was not interested in science and ignored its influence or
importance. This conclusion would be erroneous because the
denomination held science and the study of nature in high
esteem. Nature was regarded as God's creation. To study nature
was to investigate the handiwork of God. Nature, gave insight
into the character of God. 1 There were, between the years 1900
and 1930, no fewer than eighteen articles in the various
publications of the denomination that dealt directly with the
issue of science, nature or evolution. 2 Creation and the
issues that surrounded this doctrine were prominent topics in
the Christian Reformed Church. Characteristic of most of these
articles was the irenic and reasonable manner in which these
topics were discussed. What is lacking is the strident
rhetoric and accusatory manner of other conservative
Christians during this period. An example of this
There were many essays during this period that
discussed the importance of creation. See Peter G. Berkhout,
"Nature and Scripture," Calvin College Chimes . March 1918, pp.98-101; Peter G. Berkhout, "Nature and the Student," Calvin
College Chimes, April 1918, pp. 138-141; D.H. Muyskens,
"Restatement of Doctrine," The Banner . November 14, 1924, p.
725; Cornelius Van Til, "The Education of Man - A divinely
Ordained Need," paper presented at the Educational Convention
of The National Union of Christian Schools, 26 and 27 August
1930, pp. 25-49; and Menno Bosma, Exposition of Reformed
Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Sevensma, 1907), pp. 62-73.
2 Refer to the bibliography for a complete listing.
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reasonableness can be found in the only full-length article
written by a member of the Christian Reformed Church on the
1925 Scopes Trial. Samuel Volbeda (1881-1953), Professor of
Church History at Calvin Theological Seminary, concluded that
the law prohibiting the teaching of evolution was
inappropriate because it was designed to establish a Christian
state. This response was quite different from those advanced
by other conservative Christians, such as William J. Bryan. 3
The Christian Reformed model of interaction between
science and theology can be characterized by the term
complementary. While the idea of giving praise and proper
respect is the common meaning of the word complementary, the
idea of completeness is the intended meaning in this thesis. 4
The notion of being complementary connotes a harmonious
working together of independent entities to complete a whole.
It entails that the parts function properly only when the sum
of the parts is formed. They respected and praised each other,
but, more importantly, they worked harmoniously toward the
goal of obtaining Truth. In Christian Reformed thinking Truth
was formed only when theology and science, and all other
disciplines, worked together to form a more complete picture
of the cosmos. Kuyper's idealism as expressed in his organism
Samuel Volbeda, "The Scopes Trial," Reformed Herald ,
pp. 23-26.
Complement comes from the Latin complire, to complete.
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6of science pervaded this model with its emphasis on Unity and
John B. Schoolland wrote an essay entitled Science and
Religion - Complementary Schoolland was neither a professor
nor a member of the clergy. However, his essay captured the
essence of the early Christian Reformed complementary model
The essay was written in 1935, after the heyday of Kuyperian
influence. Although Kuyper was mentioned only once, the
article represented a condensation of Kuyperian thought and
also identified key elements in the complementary model of
interaction between science and theology.
Schoolland began by arguing for the rationality of both
theological and scientific truths. He criticized the popular
nineteenth-century interpretation that knowledge was divided
into two areas, rational and irrational. This division implied
that subjective knowledge, i.e., religious knowledge, was
inferior to scientific knowledge. The common understanding of
the relationship between religious beliefs and scientific
knowledge, as understood by Schoolland, was that religious
factors
May be a potent and legitimate factor in the privacy ofyour own thinking, [but] the only rational basis of
Science in this chapter, unless otherwise indicated, is
made up of those disciplines normally associated with the word
science in the twentieth century. Kuyper 's idea of science as
all formal attempts to understand the cosmos (Wissensohaft)
seems to have been abandoned in the migration to America.
John Schoolland, "Science and Religion - Complementary "Calvin Forum. October 1935, pp. 67-9.
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expression involves opinions you might reasonably be
expected to entertain on the commonly accepted ground of
science. (Emphasis mine) 7
The implication was that theological opinions, (they could
hardly be called truths), while helpful on a personal level,
did not have the same epistemological weight as scientific
discoveries. They were not reasonable and certainly not
scientific.
But, he countered, religious truths are rational because
"God reveals himself in a two-fold manner: indirectly and
mediately through Nature, and directly and immediately through
Scripture". Our desire, he added, is to make "both our
religious and our scientific views reasonable and
understandable not only, but harmonious as well." He went on
to say, "we have a dualism. . .two aspects of Truth, not
separate and distinct, least of all antithetical, but
complementary and interrelated." 8 Theology was to be
considered a "co-discoverer of Truth" and not the harmless
cogitation of theologians. 9
Theology and science were two aspects of Truth; one
without the other was considered intellectual suicide.
Theological propositions were to be heeded and "science and
7Ibid., p. 67.
"ibid.
'ibid., p. 68.
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Religion must be brought into clearer harmony and synthesized
into one whole." 10 There should be, then, nothing but the
highest regard for both science and theology. Since they
represented "two aspects of Truth" and were to be kept
separated, there should exist, Schoolland insisted, a balance
between the study of these two disciplines. He said:
Young students should be taught to seek truth wherever it
may be found, whether it be in the field of science or of
revealed religion. To train carefully in either, and fail
to prepare for the other, is to court disaster, in one-
sidedness, compartmentalism, intellectual dishonesty, and
confusion.
While science may use empirical methods for obtaining
knowledge and theology may rely more on rational methods and
may appear more subjective, Schoolland emphasized that both
were important in discovering Truth.
A second characteristic of the complementary model was
that science and theology were to function in relative
isolation from each other. Schoolland said, "Each has its own
aim and its own field for investigation. .. [and] its own
metaphysics." 12 This was an important characteristic in the
Christian Reformed model because neither science nor theology
required the other for verification of conclusions and the
progress of neither was impeded by the other. This was made
clear when he said:
10Ibid., p. 67.
11 Ibid., p. 69.
12Ibid., p. 68.
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Science and religion both represent dynamic, progressively
developing concepts. Embodying, as they do, the two aspects
of Truth, their development must run concurrently, mutually
complementing and illuminating one another. It is both
incorrect and dangerous to regard them as developing
parallel with one another - it implies too rigid an
independence, a source of false antithesis. Neither should
be thought of as in a complete stage of development. 13
Science had the entire realm of creation to investigate while
theology had the revealed Word of God. The objects of study,
underlying assumptions, and methodologies were different in
each area. Both disciplines, he argued, in order to complement
each other, must have the freedom to develop without
constraints imposed by the other.
The third, and last, characteristic of the complementary
model exhibited in Schoolland's essay was the identification
of life-principles as the means for achieving the
complementary relationship between science and theology. These
principles were variously described by Schoolland as the "true
essentials", the "critical concepts", and "the frontier -
along the line where science and religion seem to deviate."
These phrases are synonymous with the "life-principles" of
Kuyper. Unity and completeness could only be found when
science and theology both were derived from the same
principles.
As expressed by Kuyper, and accepted by Schoolland, a
scientific conclusion could not complement theological truths
if the corresponding principles were antithetical. That is why
13 Ibid., p. 67.
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Schoolland could have such confidence in scientific facts.
Facts were not to be feared, he argued:
But their pre-mature, incomplete, or erroneous
interpretation that is perversive of religious - or even
scientific - truth. Interpretation requires philosophic and
religious scrutiny and synthesis. 14
If it appeared that scientific facts opposed theological
propositions, he argued, it was only because the
interpretation were based on principles and world views that
were opposed to Christian principles. So, disharmony could
exist between science and theology but it was not because of
conflict among facts but because of opposing principles and
world views.
Schoolland encouraged unqualified study of nature because
he was confident that "there can be no danger or harm in
facts" and that perfect harmony ideally existed between the
two branches of Truth. 15 Conservative Protestant churchmen were
not so confident. Conservative Presbyterians and
fundamentalists were perceived as living in constant fear that
one day science would uncover a fact that would conclusively
In their philosophical
14Ibid., p. 68.
Cornelius Van Til remarked about this undue reliance
on facts when he said, "The fight on this sector of the front
is sometimes waged in such a manner as though the issue could
be settled at this place alone and once for all. So also men
sometimes fight about the trustworthiness of the Scripture as
though the next move of someone's spade in Palestine coulddetermine everything." "The Education of Man - A Divinely
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thinking, facts could mortally wound Christianity. On the
other hand, Schoolland was confident that science could not
be hostile to theology because "true science and true religion
are complementary." 17 This statement appears to be naive, but
Schoolland was operating under the philosophical assumption
that principles, not facts, determined the degree of harmony.
Science and theology, in the complementary model, were
viewed as rational, essential and interrelated co-discovers
of Truth. But the philosophical road to this conclusion was
long and winding. If the underlying principles used to
interpret the facts in both fields were essentially similar
and if each discipline carefully examined its own field of
investigation and honored the investigations of the other,
then there could be harmony.
There are, then, three areas of Neo-Calvinist
epistemology that must be examined. First, the justification
for, and importance of, the claim that theological truths were
rational and epistemologically equivalent to scientific
truths. Secondly, the justification for, and the importance
of, the strict separation of disciplines. And, finally, the
principial justification for the complementary model, which
can also be expressed negatively as the principial explanation
Ordained Need," paper presented at the Educational Convention
of the National Union of Christian Schools, Holland, Michigan,
27 and 28 August 1930, p. 28.
Schoolland, "Science and Religion," p. 69.
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for disharmony between science and theology.
EPISTEMOLICAL EQUALITY
The primary characteristic of the Christian Reformed
model was the belief in the epistemological equality of
theological and scientific propositions. Without equality the
church's scholars realized that science and theology could not
be complementary. In fact, without epistemological equality
the entire superstructure of Kuyper's Christian philosophy
would crumble. The only other option would be the duality of
knowledge expressed in the nineteenth-century
rational/irrational dichotomy.
Due to the influence of Kant, as has been demonstrated,
contemporary thinkers believed that theological propositions
were based on faith and not demonstrable by use of reason and
were valuable only in so far as they regulated ethical and
moral living. To the christian Reformed thinker this was
unacceptable. In the words of Henry Stob this thinking implied
that "a man must cut himself asunder and posit an antithesis
within himself." 18 This antithesis involved the artificial
separation of faith and reason and it "denied all theoretical
expression other than that involved in value judgments [to
theology]
,
and that science is denied the wide and absolute
Henry Stob, "Some Antitheses in Life," paper presented
at the Educational Theories and Practices Convention of The
National Union of Christian Schools, Paterson, New Jersev
Fall 1939, p. 78.
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perspective of religion." 19 Faith and Reason, Stob argued, were
not antithetical but were key elements in the quest for
knowledge and Truth.
Underlying all rationality were Kuyper's life-principles
which provided the foundation for all ideas and actions. How
one did science was as much an outcome of this foundation as
how one did theology. The test for rationality, in Neo-
Calvinist philosophy, was not whether a claim could be proved
empirically, but whether a proposition followed logically from
a world view. For example, given that a person accepted the
principle that God existed, the theological claims that God
created the universe, that Scripture is the Word of God, and
that sin has severely damaged the rationality of humanity were
rational statements. These claims, or the principles upon
which they rested, could not be considered irrational or
merely existential. They were propositions that reflected
reality as perceived from the world view established from
Christian principles. They were a reflection of reality just
as the theories of the atom, of relativity and of heredity
reflected reality.
The antithesis about which Stob so urgently warned his
fellow Christians was the antithesis that broke asunder Truth.
Being heavily influenced by idealism the church leaders tended
to think in terms of a corpus of ideal truth that represented
19 Ibid., p. 77-8.
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all the knowledge of the universe. Whereas in most idealistic
systems this Truth was found in an impersonal Other, in
Kuyperian thought Truth was God. Stob expressed this
"Christianized" idealism when he contrasted God with other
"Interpretive Principles".
He is greater than the "Being" of Parmenides, the "Nous"
of Anaxagoras, the "Ideas" of Plato, the "One" of Plotinus,
the "Substance" of Spinoza, the "Universal Ego" of Fichte
or the "Absolute Spirit" of Hegel. 20
Each discipline provided one piece of the puzzle. To state
that theological truths were inferior to scientific truths
was to the Christian Reformed scholar the same thing as
stating there were two corpora of Truth. Stob stressed the
importance of epistemological unity between faith and reason
by closing his argument with:
One thing would seem to be guite certain: that we cannot
and may not insulate our scientific moods from our
religious attitudes. We cannot with impunity
compartmentalize our lives. We may not introduce the kind
of antithesis that separates the student in us from theChristian, so destroying our essential unity. 21
Faith was not inferior to reason, it was simply another avenue
that led to Truth. Unity as expressed in Kuyper's organism of
science and the ideal of Truth were the primary motives for
arguing for epistemological equality for science and theology.
Others in the Kuyperian tradition also argued for the
essential unity of Truth. Schoolland, as was demonstrated,
20 Ibid., p. 84.
21 Ibid., p. 81.
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saw science and religion as two aspects of Truth. They were
not, however, separate and distinct, resulting in
compartmentalization. 22 Clarence Bouma (1891-1962), Professor
of Dogmatics at Calvin Theological Seminary, in speaking
against the "Kantian dualism" that made theological knowledge
inferior, said:
In our proposed propaganda we should be fundamental and
hammer away at the impossibility, the utter futility of
thus divorcing religious knowledge from scientific
knowledge. We should protest against this attempt to treat
the mind of the child as composed of a number of watertight
compartments. We should make clear that, though the
religious and the "scientific" outlook are not identical,
they must form a unity. 23
By stating that religious knowledge and scientific
knowledge were not identical but, yet, did form a unity, Bouma
was emphasizing the Kuyperian equality of both types of
knowledge. The Christian Reformed leaders did not attempt to
demonstrate that theological knowledge was equal to scientific
knowledge because it was derived from empirical methodology.
Liberal theologians and conservative Presbyterian theologians,
to gain more respect for theology, took this route. Rather,
they argued that scientific propositions were formulated in
a fashion fundamentally identical to the formulation of
theological propositions. The science of the positivists and
materialists, the church's leaders insisted, was based on the
Schoolland, "Science and Religion," p. 67.
23 Clarence Bouma, "Propagating Christian Education,"
paper presented at the Educational Convention of The National
Union of Christian Schools, 26 August 1925, pp. 111-12.
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same subjectivity and faith that were identified as the
reasons for the inferiority of theological knowledge.
It was characteristic of the Christian Reformed method
of apologetics that it challenged the commonplace of the
opposition. It was not content to accept the equality of
theology and science based on methodological similarities.
Instead, Christian Reformed intellectuals argued that
scientific and theological knowledge were equal because
scientific knowledge was epistemologically identical to
theological knowledge.
Kuyper emphasized the fact that all knowledge was derived
from the interaction of the subjective principles of the
individual and sense experiences. This interaction implied
that the acquisition of all knowledge was the same and that
all knowledge was subjective. Christian Reformed intellectuals
used principialism to drive home the idea that knowledge was
defined by the principles a person holds. Cornelius Van Til
(1895-1988), Professor of Apologetics at Westminster
Theological Seminary and staunch Antithetical Kuyperian,
emphasized this when he said:
Before a single step can be taken in the direction of
searching for facts, a scientist must first decide whether
he will undertake his investigation in a theistic or in an
anti-theistic spirit.
Cornelius Van Til, "Our Attitude Toward Evolution," TheBanner
. December 11, 1931, p. 1115.
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Clarence Bouma spoke of the fact that scholars "cannot help
thinking in terms of some world and life view." 25 In concert
with Kant's revolution in epistemology, Christian Reformed
scholars believed scientific knowledge was a product of
subjective rationalism and empirical observation.
To further demonstrate the dependence of science on non-
empirical knowledge, the leadership agreed with Kuyper that
faith enabled humanity to acquire knowledge divorced of
empirical methods. Kuyper had made it clear that the scientist
just as much as the theologian depended on faith and wisdom
to formulate propositions. Peter G. Berkhout, a medical doctor
who wrote extensively about the interaction between science
and religion in Christian Reformed publications during the
1920's, had this to say about faith.
But the Christian believes in still a fifth means whereby
man may obtain knowledge. That fifth organ of knowledge is
faith. This is a kind of intuitive knowledge. 26
After assuring the reader that this faith is different from
"saving faith", he continued:
It is stated then that the scientist too lives by faith in
the last analysis.
25 Clarence Bouma, "Calvinism and Constructive
Scholarship," Calvin Forum . February 1940, p. 135-37.
! Peter Berkhout, "The Conflict Between Science andReligion," The Young Calvinist . July/August 1928, p. 184.
27 Ibid.
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The belief in the Unity and Absoluteness of Truth, the
emphasis on subjective, yet rational, principles as the
foundation for knowledge and the idea that faith was necessary
for knowledge, convinced Christian Reformed intellectuals that
scientific knowledge was not superior to theological
knowledge. They rejected any attempt to give to theological
knowledge an inferior role in formulating philosophies,
theories or interpretations.
Rather, science was brought down from its lofty position
held by the realists, materialists and positivists. While the
Kantian dualism between natural and supernatural knowledge was
maintained, church leaders refused to acknowledge any
difference between theological and scientific knowledge.
Science took its place along with all the other disciplines
dedicated to furthering knowledge. The natural sciences and
theology were seen as complementary parts of the whole. Each
was important for the discoveries it added to the total and
accumulated knowledge of God's creation.
The emphasis on Kantian terminology and thought, in part,
accounted for the weakening impact of the Kuyperian system in
Christian Reformed circles after 1930. Removed from the
seedbed of rationalism and idealism and transplanted in the
soil of empirical America, the old leaders were not able to
maintain the philosophical roots and vitality so necessary for
such a system. British empiricism, always so strong in America
and especially in conservative Presbyterian groups, was a
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force that pulled many Christian Reformed leaders, born in
America and intent on becoming "American," into its sphere of
influence.
SPHERE SOVEREIGNTY
While the idealistic notion of the unity of Truth and the
Kantian idea of subjectivity allowed for the possibility of
epistemological equality between science and theology, what
functionally kept one from dominating the other? Since
religion and theology played a vital and essential role in all
aspects of life in the Christian Reformed Church, it is
important to understand how the temptation to make science a
tool of theology was avoided. It is also important to
understand how the leadership avoided the great temptation of
this period to view science as the source of all answers for
humanity's problems.
Schoolland was aware of the dangers of an unbalanced
relationship between science and religion. He said:
As we look about us we usually find either Science or
Religion in the saddle Either the inspired Word or the
conclusions of physical Science is accepted as the major
criterion for Truth. And where either predominates the
other is apt to be neglected or even despised. 28
Throughout history, Schoolland observed, one or the other
tended to dominate. When that happened, the unity of Truth
was destroyed and error and deception crept in. The idea of
"sphere sovereignty" will be important as we investigate how
Schoolland, "Science and Religion," p. 68.
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the church's intelligentsia was able to maintain a balanced
perspective needed for their complementary model.
Kuyper originally developed sphere sovereignty as a
political theory, but it was used by Christian Reformed
intellectuals to regulate the expansion of intellectual
disciplines as well. 29 Sphere sovereignty was the idea that God
ordained spheres of authority which were independent of each
other. Science, politics, theology and every other area of
human knowledge had authority over its respective facts and
theories. However, there was to be coordination between these
areas as they searched for knowledge and each sphere was
responsible to God for carrying out God's directives.
Conflict, error, and deception arose when one sphere
attempted to dominate the others or when a sphere ceased to
submit to the directives of God. Kuyper 's Lectures on
Calvinism expounds in great detail how the various spheres,
such as religion, politics, science and the arts, were to
operate within their spheres and as a whole. 30 Hermann Bavinck
also strongly endorsed the idea when he said:
In searching after these causes the eminent conception of
evolution, as a working hypothesis, has done eminent
service but here the mistake has been made. . .natural
science remains, therefore, perfectly free in its own
29 Irving Hexham, "Christian Politics according to AbrahamKuyper," Crux 19 (March 1983), pp. 2-7; and James Skillen andStanley Calrson-Thies, "Religion and Political Developmentsin Nineteenth Century Holland," Publius 12 (1982), pp 43-64
30 Kuyper 's Lectures on Calvinism began with an overview
of his "life-system" then each successive chapter dealt withhow Calvinism effected religion, politics, science and art
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sphere; but it is not the only science, and must therefore
cease striving to construe religious and ethical phenomena
after the same physico-chemical and methematico-mechanical
fashion as is warranted and required in the case of
numberless natural phenomena. (Emphasis mine) 31
As was pointed out in the discussion on the unity of
Truth, the intelligentsia never viewed science and theology
as identical, only equal. Clarence Bouma said, for example:
We should make clear that, though the religious and the
"scientific" outlook are not identical, they must form a
unity.
They were seen as serving different ends, investigating
different facts and using different methodologies. Science
served to help humanity understand God's natural revelation
while theology sought to understand God's special revelation.
Kuyper, as was shown, only had contempt for those theologians
who attempted to raise the prestige of theology by adopting
empirical methods. Schoolland also wrote:
True science and true religion are complementary. Science
heeds the injunction to 'have dominion over the earth and
subdue it'. Religion aims at the 'thoroughly furnished man
of God'. To the degree that one succeeds in bring about
harmonious integration of these two aims there can no
longer be any thought of 'scientific vs. personal opinion',
or of a 'compartmental mind'. 33
Herman Bavinck, The Philosophy of Revelation (London:
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909; reprint ed.
, Grand Rapids:
Baker Book House, 1979), p. 86.
Bouma, "Propagating," p. 111-12.
Schoolland, "Science and Religion," p. 69.
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Science and theology each had different tasks to perform.
Acquisition of knowledge and progress toward truth were
proportional to the amount of independence granted each. The
result would be a unified picture of reality, not the
fragmented view that was perceived as dominant in American
thinking.
Theology would be in error if it questioned the theories
of relativity, of the structure of the atom, or of natural
selection. As long as the scientific theory remained in the
sphere reserved for science, the conclusions were off-limits
to theology. Similarly, the church's intellectuals argued that
science could not pass judgement on such theological
proposition as the sovereignty of God, the existence of God,
the reality of sin, or the reality of heaven and hell. These
were matters that could only be decided by theologians since
spiritual conclusions could not be drawn from natural facts.
Christian Reformed thinkers found it unthinkable to use
theological propositions to support scientific theories. They
viewed, for example, the natural theology of Presbyterians as
an intellectually dangerous position. The principle danger,
laid out by Schoolland, was the increase of prestige for
science and the corresponding denigration of theology. A
situation which was recognized as not conducive to
complementary thinking. He said:
It must be admitted that scientific criteria gain added
prestige and power, whether it be through criticism or
through substantiation [of theology] . Religion seems
increasingly lacking in self-confidence, the ability to
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stand on its own feet. Science, on the other hand, because
of its greater assumed independence, does not share in this
feeling, and seeks no corroboration outside of itself. 34
Schoolland concluded that science was always the winner if
definite boundaries were not established. As such, Christian
Reformed thinkers viewed natural theology as highly suspect.
They saw it as a definite blurring of boundaries that would
only increase the possibility of error and confusion.
Sphere sovereignty was especially beneficial to the
pursuit of science. Scientists could roam freely in the
natural world, free to discover any fact about the universe.
Since all creation was from the hand of God, there was unity
and harmony and the church did not have to fear what science
might find. Since theology and science were separate,
independent and equal, neither required the support of the
other to validate its truth claims. Neither discipline need
attempt to dominate. While there was considerable dialogue and
even modification of propositions on both sides, the dividing
line between the two disciplines was rarely blurred.
PRINCIPIALISM
The Kantian notion that all human rationality was
subjective provided the philosophical justification for
equality between the sciences and theology. Sphere sovereignty
prevented one from dominating the other and provided a means
for free expression and independent progress for both. It now
34 Schoolland, "Science and Religion," p. 68.
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remains to investigate the justification for harmony and unity
between science and theology and also to explain the reality
of conflict between the two. Equality does not necessarily
entail that science and theology will be complementary.
Christian Reformed scholars believed that science and theology
were complementary only when they operated from the same life-
principles. Conversely, disharmony and conflict resulted when
they operated from conflicting life-principles. The conflict
was not between science and theology, per se, but between
principles and world views.
Berkhout, in his article The Conflict Between Science and
Religion, asked if there was conflict between science and
religion. His answer is illustrative of what has been said
regarding the unity of truth and the importance of principles.
Now as to the question whether there is such a conflict,
it can be answered by "no" and "yes". Ideally considered
there can be no conflict between the two. God is the
Creator of our wonderful universe, and the study and
appreciation of the universe in all its aspects should
never interfere with man's religion.
. .But through sin
everything has been marred, and so too the relation between
science and religion has been disrupted. And as certainly
as there is no conflict between religion and science in the
ideal sense, so just as decidedly is there a conflict in
the practical sense. u
Ideally, since God created everything, there should be no
conflict between science and theology. Yet, sin has disrupted
this ideal situation. Rationality was functioning abnormally.
35 Berkhout, "Conflict," pp. 161-62.
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The doctrine of creation was essential to the
epistemology of the Christian Reformed Church. It was more
than a theological doctrine, it was basic to their concept of
rationality. Van Til associated the doctrine of creation with
a correct view of education and culture when he said:
The creation idea, when seen to be the presupposition of
the covenant idea, brings out the distinctiveness of the
Reformed view of education. .. .But they [Christians who
believe in creation] see no need of fighting for the
creation concept in order to assure a foundation for a
genuine Christian culture. 36
The doctrine of creation taught that the ability to reason
was a creation of God. God also created the relationships
between facts, as well as the facts themselves. God also
placed in each person the ability to recognize these
relationships. Absolute Truth was approached by those who
could best understand the "thoughts of God" that had been
implanted in humanity.
The doctrine of the fall recognized that the harmony
between various parts of Truth that was established by God was
irretrievably destroyed. The principle of Unity, sought after
by every idealist philosopher, was found by Christian Reformed
intellectuals to be inherent in the Creator/Creature
dichotomy. But this relationship was now imperfect and,
therefore, humanity's ability to understand the cosmos was
imperfect. Ideally, there was to be harmony between science
36 Van Til, "Education of Man," p. 25.
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and theology. This harmony was to result in perfect
understanding of Truth. However, because of sin, principles
and world views were not in harmony with the "thoughts of God'
and error and disharmony were the results.
The effects of sin were very real in the Neo-Calvinist
epistemology. Like Kuyper, Christian Reformed scholars argued
that sin not only resulted in spiritual separation from God,
it also affected humanity's ability to understand creation.
Dietrich Kromminga (1879-1947), Professor of Historical
Theology at Calvin Theological Seminary, in an article which
was an exposition of Romans 8:19-22, discussed the results of
the fallen nature of humanity.
Grant that man has fallen, and it must follow that the
power of interpretation and the power of control has
slipped from his hands. And the history of natural science
is a copious illustration of the unstableness of man's
interpretation of nature.... 37
The fall established the religious antithesis and from
the antithesis resulted two fundamentally opposing views
regarding creation. Berkhout emphasized the relationship
between sin and antitheticalism when he said:
But it is a tremendously important principle of Calvinism,
that creation is no longer normal, but thru the fall of
Adam has become abnormal. This is one of the fundamental
differences between our view of Nature and that of others,
for example, of evolutionists. 38
Dietrich Kromminga, "Nature's Expectation, or, the
Christian View of Nature," Religion and Culture l (February
1920) : 14
38 Berkhout, "Nature and Scripture," p. 99.
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Kronuninga also emphasized the abnormality of the present
status of creation when he said:
For not only does it [the Bible] know of orders of nature
differing from the present, but, as we saw, it declares the
present order to be neither original nor ultimate. In fact,
it calls the present state of nature abnormal and
unnatural.
Some chose, they observed, to ignore the reality of
creation, the effects of sin and ultimately the existence
of God. From this position, the antithesis was
established. On one side were the normalists who saw no
beginning or end of the universe and who only saw natural
mechanisms at work. On the other were the abnormalists
who saw God at work and the effects of sin on
rationality. Each position was established upon a set of
principles.
Kromminga illustrated the conflict between the two
world views when he commented on the existence of two
views of nature. The one view, in harmony with Scripture,
sought to understand nature in light of man. The second
view sought to understand man in light of nature. He
concluded:
It is no wonder especially, that the great antithesis
between the regenerate and the unregenerate, which by God's
grace is made to run through the human race results also
in two antithetical views of nature. 40
39
Kronuninga, "Nature's Expectation," p. 5.
40 Ibid., p. 12.
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Whether a church leader was Kuyperian or Bavinckian, the
assumption that life-principles determined how an individual
interpreted the world was universal. Henry Schultze (1893-
1959), Professor of New Testament at Calvin Theological
Seminary and later President of Calvin College, while
referring to the particular life-principles accepted by the
Christian Reformed Church, was making a statement on the
universality of life-principles when he said:
We are a biased people. We might as well candidly admit it.
An unbiased, a purely objective examination of the subject-
matter at hand [evolution] is for us quite impossible. .. .It
[the Word of God] is the truth and everything absolutely
incompatible with it is untruth. That's our bias. 41
Schultze implied that the claims made by positivists and
realists that a scientist could be completely objective and
unbiased when observing nature were false. Not only were they
false, but they pointed to a bias. By claiming they had no
biases, they made a statement as to the nature of their bias
and underlying principles.
The doctrines of creation and the fall were benchmarks
in determining which side of the antithesis a person was on.
Principles, or world view, determined whether a person
accepted or rejected these ideas. It did not surprise the
Christian Reformed intellectuals that the most ardent
supporters of evolutionism were vehemently opposed to the
Henry Schultze, "Our Attitude Toward the Theory of
Evolution," Reformed Herald
, May 1926, p. 188.
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ideas of creation and the reality of sin. 42 Opposition to the
ideas of creation and sin was not derived from scientific
facts, churchmen argued, but was a natural outgrowth of the
principles upon which normalists constructed their
evolutionism.
Life-principles were an essential component in any
analysis of the cosmos. Accumulation of facts was of course
needed to begin to understand the universe, but the life-
principles were responsible for generating knowledge. Van Til
argued that the world view of the scientist was more important
than the accumulation of facts when he wrote:
Similarly before a single step can be taken in the
direction of searching for facts a scientist must first
decide whether he will undertake his investigation in a
theistic or in an antitheistic spirit. Before the
specialist talks "facts" to us we insist on talking
philosophy to him. 43
Conclusions and theories were not the results of facts only.
While facts were obviously necessary to interpret nature
correctly, they were molded by the "spirit", or world view,
of the scientist.
Evolutionism can be defined as those philosophical and
theological positions that built systems of thought and ideas
around a loose interpretation of the scientific theory of
evolution. Very often, they incorporated religious, even
Christian, terminology and symbols but reinterpreted them
along naturalistic lines. For example, Herbert Spencer's
Social Darwinism, John Fiske's Synthetic Philosophy and
Auguste Comte's naturalistic religion are examples of
evolutionism. See Moore, Post-Darwinian Controversies , pp.217-251 for more examples of evolutionism.
43 Van Til, "Our Attitude," p. 1115.
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Facts held only a supportive position in the Christian
Reformed epistemology. Facts were seen as pawns in the
struggle between world views. Van Til stated:
Our apologetic can, accordingly, afford to use no time for
details.— Facts, to be sure, are stubborn things, but
facts must be interpreted. The philosophy assumed by
evolutionists is a far more dangerous thing than the
evidence that they bring So also with the so-called
facts of psychology and anthropology that have a bearing
upon education. These facts, too, must be interpreted. And
interpreted they are. Now all facts are interpreted in
either of two ways. Men are either Theists or Anti-Theists.
The whole battle about facts is a mad scramble between
these two kinds of philosophers. 44
Facts were considered supportive because they could not exist
on their own. In keeping with Kuyper's interpretation of
Kantian thought, facts had meaning only in relation to a
priori principles that gave meaning to facts.
Appealing to facts alone to justify a proposition was
viewed by Christian Reformed intellectuals as inconclusive
and intellectually dangerous. Opposing sides, they argued,
simply choose those facts that support their views and ignore
the others. This reliance on fact as the sole arbitrator of
disagreement was seen as the root cause of all the -isms of
the world, stob points out the futility of relying on facts
when he said:
The result is a constant recurrence of rival 'isms'. Let
one take one's stand on Thought and Feeling will put in its
word; the rationalist makes the mystic vocal. Choose tointerpret things in terms of physics and biology willprotest; vitalism lives by mechanism and vice versa. Exhalt
Van Til, "Education of Man," pp. 28-9.
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[sic] Mind and Things will obtrude; be an idealist and the
realist has a raison d'etre. 45
The existence of "raw facts" was a philosophical
impossibility in the Kuyperian system. Every theory was based
on interpreted facts that were viewed from the perspective of
a world view and every world view was either theistic or anti-
theistic. Kromminga observed:
We both [the theist and anti-theist] read into nature [read
facts] what we will; the one what by faith he has learned
from the Word of his God, the other what his unbelief has
gleaned from man's heart and life apart from God. Which one
of the two interpretations the individual chooses, depends
entirely upon his attitude to God. 46
Disharmony and disunity were removed from any discussion
of facts and identified as a result of warring world views.
There did not exist somewhere facts that contradicted other
facts. Belief in the unity of creation would not allow that
admission. If fundamental conflict arose, principial analyses
was employed to discover the root cause for disharmony. Facts
were considered value-neutral and could be divorced from a
world view and used in the service of God. Jacob Klapwijk,
Professor of Philosophy at the Free University of Amsterdam,
expressed this view when he commented on the problem of using
the contributions of "non-Christian thinkers."
Stob, "Some Antitheses," p. 73-4.
Kromminga, "Nature's Expectation," p. 12.
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I may gratefully acknowledge their gifts, God's gifts.
Yet I must always extract their insights from the
ideological connections present in them.... 47
Stob had this to say about the "gifts" that could be gleaned
from the various systems of thought devised by human
reasoning.
It [the antithesis] will enable us, for example, to
do justice to the partial and distorted truths of
pragmatism and behaviourism without either committing
ourselves to the errors in these systems or high-
handedly condemning the systems as a whole ; . . . This
will also mean, of course, that we shall be able to
give due consideration to the legitimate insights of
Idealism without succumbing to its deceptive charms. 48
The separation of fact from its interpretive world view
allowed for free and unrestrained exploration of creation.
Acceptance of the fact that the earth was older than 6,000
years did not mean a person had to accept the anti-theistic
implications that went with that fact. The implications that
Scripture was fallible and that God did not create the
universe were derived from an anti-theistic world view not
from the scientific fact. A Christian could, they argued,
accept the old age of the earth and with a theistic world view
construct another interpretation.
Implied in this supportive role of facts was the
possibility of a plurality of logical and rational views, if
facts were used to support world views, then it was possible
47
48
Klapwijk, "Dutch Neo-Calvinist Tradition," p. 109.
Stob, "Some Antitheses," p. 76.
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to have two opposing conclusions based on identical facts.
Kromminga's discussion of the relationship between humanity
and nature serves to illustrate this point. It is clear, he
wrote, that science has shown that humanity and nature are
inextricably interwoven.
Somehow man fits exactly into nature and nature is the
stage for human history; and therefore one's view of
nature, whatever it may be, will call for a
corresponding view of man; and in the same manner,
whatever one's view of man may be, it clamors for a
view of nature that is in agreement with it. 49
Yet from these facts two opposing systems of thought
developed. The one system, based on a Christian world view,
viewed "nature in the light of man." The other system of
thought, based on unscriptural views, understood man in
relation to nature. 50 Both systems were logically sound and
rational in that they appear to "square with the facts of
nature." 51 Kuyper's notion of two sciences was reflected in
this conclusion. Both systems, because the facts were
consistently interpreted in accordance with their accompanying
world views, were intellectually acceptable. But only one was
closest to reality, that one which was closest to reflecting
God's thoughts.
49 Kromminga, "Nature's Expectations," p. 4.
50 Ibid., p. 5.
51 Ibid., p. 12.
104
The urgency to develop a Christian philosophy is apparent
in this idea of plurality. Christians needed a system of
thought that interpreted the facts of nature from a Christian
perspective. The attractiveness of evolution was so
compelling, they argued, because it followed logically from
anti-theistic principles, it was an entirely self-contained
system of thought. Those that accepted evolutionism accepted
it because it agreed with their principles, not necessarily
because it was factually compelling. If Christians developed
a Christian philosophy, the facts of nature would be
interpreted to present a world created, governed, and
sustained by God.
Principialism provided the explanation of why there was
both harmony and disharmony between science and theology. It
removed the source of conflict from the disciplines themselves
and placed it in the practitioners. Science and theology were
not enemies or even rivals. There was no source of conflict
between the facts of science and the facts of theology. The
root cause of conflict was sin which resulted in the
antithesis. Humans were on one side or the other of the
antithesis and adopted the accompanying principles and world
views. Science and theology could be complementary or they
could be bitter enemies.
The complementary model can best be illustrated by the
position taken by the Christian Reformed Church on the theory
of evolution. The church officially never condemned the
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scientific facts or conclusions of the theory. However, its
leaders consistently questioned speculative conclusions and
condemned the philosophical view of evolutionism derived from
the scientific theory. The leaders of the church consciously
practiced the idea of sphere sovereignty while at the same
time judiciously applying principial analysis to the
conclusions derived from the facts of evolution.
THE COMPLEMENTARY MODEL AND EVOLUTION
The boundaries established for the study of evolution
were found in the creeds of the church and in the proclamation
that Genesis 1 and 2 were historical. Article 12 of the Belgic
Confession stated:
We believe that the Father by the Word, that is, by
His Son, has created of nothing the heaven, the earth,
and all creatures, when it seemed good unto him,
giving unto every creature its being, shape, form and
several offices to serve its Creator. 52
Article 14 also declared:
God created man out of the dust of the earth, and made
and formed him after His own image and likeness. 53
Clearly, the creeds taught that God created everything out of
nothing and humanity was a special creation.
52
"The Belgic Confession" in Psalter Hymnal. Doctrinal
Standards and Liturgy of the Christian Reformed Church (Grand
Rapids: Publication Committee of the Christian Reformed
Church, 1934)
,
p. 7.
53 Ibid., p. 8.
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Also, the Synod of the Christian Reformed Church during
the 1950 's and 1960's, when petitioned to make an official
pronouncement on evolution, refused to do so. The position
taken at the 1951 Synod, the first time the topic of evolution
had reached this highest governing body of the denomination,
set the tone for future discussions. The decisions and
thinking were also consistent with Kuyperian thought of
earlier decades. The committee designated to investigate this
petition concluded:
Synod has refrained from intimating what concept of
evolution would be acceptable. Synod has merely
directed the attention of the Churches to the fact
that acceptance of the « historicity of the revelation
in Gen. 1 and 2 implies that a Reformed scientific
researcher should observe the fact that Divine
creation should be the starting-point of scientific
investigation. Whether and to what extent in the
development of what had been created God has made use
of evolutionary processes, is for the believing
researcher to establish.
The committee report also emphasized the possible violation
of the principle of sphere sovereignty when it stated:
Generally, because it has to preach the Word of God,
which is not a scientific treatise and which should
not be bound to any particular exegetical exposition,
the Church should observe the utmost discretion in
making all kinds of pronouncements in connection with
scientific matters.
54 Christian Reformed Church, Acts of Synod. 1951 of the
Christian Reformed Church (Grand Rapids: Christian Reformed
Publishing House, 1951), p. 58.
p. 61.
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The implication of this report was that a scientist was free
to develop any theory that did not violate the boundaries
established by Reformed principles as expressed in the creeds
of the church.
Within these limitations the church leaders were willing
to accept much of the scientific conclusions of the
evolutionists. In 1907, M. J. Bosma (1874-1912), a respected
theologian within the church, said "we thankfully acknowledge
the great work the advocates of evolution have done in
extending our knowledge of nature." 5* In 1920, Kromminga
conceded much to the evolutionist's science when he said:
Not only in grouping animals, plants, and inanimate
objects together are the Bible and Modern Science at
one, they agree also in relating this totality of
nature most intimately to man. Both recognize the fact
that man on his physical side comes up out of nature
and belongs to nature. 57
He was even more forthright, claiming that some form of
evolution does take place.
The present state of things in nature is expressedly
conceived of as lasting for some length of time....
And thus the biblical view of nature has room for all
the facts which our scientists may discover about
nature in her present condition. 58
M.J. Bosma, "Evolution and Why We Reject It," The
Banner December 12, 1907, p. 607.
57 Kromminga, "Nature's Expectation," p. 4.
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Others were equally open about the validity of scientific
evidence for evolution. John Van Haitsma (1884-1965),
Professor of Chemistry at Calvin College, said in 1913:
The object of this article is not to deny that there
is continuity in variation, certainly not within the
limits of species. Nor do we believe that it is good
science to assert dogmatically that the Creator does
not, and can not, employ some kind of evolutionary
process for bringing about many changes in the organic
Finally, Hessel Bouma (1884-1971) wrote:
I do not deny the possibility that there may be a
certain truth in the evolutionary theory as to the
development and relation of the species, the age of
the world, and other points. It may be necessary
sometimes to reconsider the popular exegesis of some
parts of Scripture that seem to be hostile to any form
of an evolutionary way of working by our God.
Of the numerous writers who commented on evolution during the
years between 1900 and 1930, very few vilified the science of
the evolutionary scientist. Schultze even chided the
fundamentalists for their unfair and vicious tactics. 61 For
the most part, scientific conclusions were accepted.
All these writers praised evolutionary discoveries with
the clear proviso that they were only praising science. If the
conclusions were products of good science, that is within the
John P. Van Haitsma, "Three Kinds of Evidence for
Evolution," The Banner . August 14, 1913, p. 513.
Hessel Bouma, "Evolution and Creation," Religion and
Culture 5 (September 1923): 83.
61 Schultze, "Our Attitude," p. 17 3.
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sphere of science, they were worthy of consideration. The
strict separation of scientific conclusion from philosophical
conclusion was a product of principial thinking. The facts,
they argued, were value-neutral in relation to the principles
used to interpret those them.
However, these scholars were quick to condemn the various
strains of philosophical evolutionism that were derived from
evolutionary facts. These were condemned for two reasons.
First, philosophical evolutionism was based on principles that
were antithetical to the christian world view. Secondly,
philosophical evolutionism originated outside the sphere
established for science. The various forms of evolutionism
were generally ethical, social or religious systems and lacked
sufficient proof because they were non-scientific systems that
were constructed by using scientific evidence.
When Schultze made the statement "Our God cannot be the
God of the evolutionist," he was not referring to the
evolutionist as scientist but the evolutionist as
philosopher/theologian. 62 He went on to explain that the god
of the philosopher of evolutionism was a deistic or
pantheistic god. Further, the views of man, sin and
regeneration envisioned by this philosopher could not be those
held by Christians. Affirming the idea of the antithesis, he
62 Ibid.
, p. 188.
110
concluded, "acceptance of either means the rejection of the
r."
63
Berkhout clearly delineated scientific conclusion from
philosophical and theological conclusions in his article
entitled The Conflict between Science and Religion . After
criticizing the fundamentalists for attacking the scientific
conclusions of evolution, he said:
But it seems to me that Christians should wage war
against the mechanistic and materialist type of
Evolution, or against materialistic monism as such. 64
In a different article, Berkhout again made a similar plea.
We are sure that it is because of these great truths,
the facts of evolution, that it has such a grip upon
the people. We see the tremendous dangers connected
with the teaching and application of the principles
of the evolutionary world-view. . . .But at the same time
we are not afraid to assimilate the good that there
is in evolution, or the good that it may have
produced
.
65
These statements are particularly important because they
were made after 1925, the year of the Scopes trial and the
years of extreme polarization in conservative Christianity.
Tension in theologically conservative groups was high at this
time. Deference to evolution, no matter how slight, was
generally viewed as defection from orthodoxy. To allow such
63 Ibid.
,
p. 188-90.
64 Berkhout, "Conflict," p. 55.
45 Peter G. Berkhout, "The Study of Heredity, A
Contribution of Evolution to the Reformed Doctrine of Original
Sin," Young Calvinist . April 1926, p. 123.
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conciliatory statements to appear in official publications and
to have little outcry, attests to the universal understanding
of the subtleties of the Kuyperian distinction between facts
and principles. Secondly, these articles appeared in The Young
Calvinist, a publication written for the youth of the church.
Confidence in the complementary nature of science and theology
was high to allow impressionable minds access to the
subtleties of Kuyperian arguments.
When the evolutionists began making theological or
metaphysical claims based on scientific facts, the Christian
Reformed leaders condemned these on the grounds that they
violated the principle of sphere sovereignty and that they
were based on antithetical principles. However, they were
willing to accept scientific statements, even if they pointed
to evolutionary mechanisms in nature.
CONCLUSION
Religious principles established the foundation and
boundaries for science and theology. Principles such as God
exists, God created, or humanity is sinful were beyond the
reach of reason but were responsible for the direction taken
in all theory construction in the Christian Reformed Church.
In this they were true Calvinists, religious thought dominated
and controlled every aspect of life. Their outlook on life was
very similar to that of the seventeenth-century Reformers.
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But along with this Calvinistic approach to life,
contemporary thought pervaded Christian Reformed thought. Kant
had desacralized human rationality by removing the
supernatural beyond the realm of reason, what remained were
legitimate areas of human investigation. Kuyper insisted that
theology was one of those areas of investigation and that
epistemologically theology was identical to the exact
sciences. Leadership in the Christian Reformed Church accepted
this notion of eguality. Theology was a science just as
Chemistry was a science. However, what had changed was the
definition of science. The Kantian notion that all sciences
were subjective and dependent on faith brought the exact
sciences to the same position as theology. What was left for
the two but to cooperate and complement each other?
But the Calvinist belief that religious principles
governed and shaped theory construction did not mesh with the
desacralized system introduced by Kant. Kantian thought also
left open the possibility that the supernatural could be
reintroduced into the realm of reason through the a priori
principles that governed rationality. It was at this point of
contact between the natural and the supernatural that Kuyper
created his Neo-Calvinism. Religious principles governed the
theory construction in science and theology. Kuyper
reinterpreted Calvin by updating Calvinism to included Kantian
psychology and idealism.
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Science and theology were viewed as equal partners in the
human quest for formal knowledge. If there was fundamental
conflict it was not necessarily because of faulty reasoning,
insufficient facts, poor observation, or theology attempting
to obstruct scientific progress, but because of a difference
in fundamental principles. Principial analyses became
essential for discovering the origin of theories and ideas.
Church leaders assumed that if differences arose between
science and theology that were determined not to be of a
principial nature, the conflict could be resolved using
reasonable means. Therefore, science and theology within the
Christian Reformed Church worked harmoniously together because
the principles held by practitioners in both areas were
assumed to be identical.
A critical but healthy dialogue characterized the
interaction between science and theology in the Christian
Reformed Church. They were viewed as rational, independent
components in the quest for truth. Faith in the complementary
nature of science and theology was deep and unshakable.
Underlying this idea of completeness was the equally
unshakable belief that God was the originator of this unity.
114
IV. OTHER MODELS IN AMERICAN
RELIGIOUS THOUGHT
The theory of evolution generated another era of crisis
in western culture. The rise of modern science, and
particularly Newtonian physics, caused the first modern debate
over God's role in nature. Since Newton's science explained
how, and presumably why, natural objects behaved as they did,
the emerging materialists and deists questioned the need of
a sustaining and sovereign God. In the second half of the
nineteenth century, in light of the evolutionary theories that
offered explanations for the diversity of life, the origin of
human nature, and the origin of the psyche and social
organizations, the last reasons for believing in a personal
God were removed. To those radical enough to think out loud,
a God of any sort had become unnecessary.
However, a careful examination of this period reveals
that most intellectuals in Protestant America continued to
struggle with the relationship between God and nature. James
Moore, in his work The Post-Darwinian Controversies , outlined
the personal struggles of many intellectuals who sacrificed
careers and personal happiness to obtain compromises that were
personally and intellectually honest.' Evolution prevented
easy answers or satisfying solutions. With its accompanying
ideas of process, randomness, selection and speculation, its
Moore / Post-Da rwinian Controversies
,
pp. 102-122.
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adherents had to break with long-standing traditions that
emphasized fixity, certainty and divine intervention. The
decision to categorically and without hesitation remove God
and theological propositions from the intellectual arena may
have come easy for some, but a majority continued to struggle
with the role of God in an evolutionary age. This chapter
explores three prevalent models that dealt with the
interaction between science and theology. The questions to be
addressed are, first, What did the adherents of these models
do with God and theology as they encountered the new
evolutionary view of nature? And, secondly. How did their
responses compare to the Kuyperian model of interaction
between science and theology?
Three broadly defined groups of thinkers pondered the
relationship between theology and science during the years
after Darwin: modernists, theological liberals and
traditionalists. The modernists were the smallest group and
diametrically opposed to the traditionalists. 2 Spokesmen for
modernism included Haeckel, Spencer, and George Matheson
(1842-1906) in Europe, and Minot Judson Savage (1841-1918)
The term modernist, or modernism, usually connotes
liberalism in general. This definition of modernism was usedby Kuyper in chapter 2. In this chapter a modernist will bedefined as one who glorifies, or deifies, the Darwinian
process of evolution and tends toward pantheism.
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and John Fiske (1842-1901) in America. 3 Members of this group
were materialists or naturalists who accepted as rational and
useful only that knowledge gained from the senses. All other
knowledge - moral, ethical, religious and aesthetic - if not
apprehended by scientific means, was irrational and
meaningless. God was usually identified as a process or force
in nature. The process of Darwinian evolution formed the
foundation for all their thinking.
The largest group consisted of the theological liberals.
Liberalism was "intermediate between traditionalism and
modernism," Ian Barbour historian of science and religion
explained, because:
It agreed with modernism in welcoming scientific
knowledge of evolution, but held that modernism had
departed too far from classical views of God and man. 4
Liberals maintained that indeed there was a relationship
between God and nature, but the focus of theology and its role
had to be redefined in light of science and modern thought.
Ernst Haeckel, The Riddle of the Universe at the Close
of the Nineteenth Century (New York: Harper & Brothers
Publishers, 1901) ; Herbert Spencer, A System of Synthetic
Philosophy
. 10 vols. (London: Williams & Norgate, 1862-1896)
;
George Matheson, Can the Old Faith Live with the New?, or. The
Problem of Evolution and Revelation (Edinburgh: William
Blackwood & Sons, 1885) ; Minot Judson Savage, The Religion of
Evolution (Boston: Lockwood, Brooks & Co.
, 1876) ; and John
Fiske, The Destiny of Man Viewed in the Light of His Origin
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1884).
4Barbour, Issues , p. 104.
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The theology of the traditionalists, the liberals maintained,
was not suitable for a modern, scientific age.
The traditionalists were mainly moderate and
conservative Presbyterians and the tradition they sought to
maintain was natural theology which embodied conservative
Calvinism and British empiricism. 5 Early fundamentalism should
be considered part of traditionalism because many adherents
came out of Presbyterianism and used British empirical
thinking extensively. 8 The truth and validity of theological
propositions, they believed, could be derived from an unbiased
examination of scientific facts and the use of common sense
reasoning. This group was generally critical of evolution and
its methodology.
MODERNISTS
The concept of God was seen by the modernists as a
hinderance to the progress of humanity. For example, Auguste
Comte (1798-1857)
, French philosopher and father of
positivism, saw humanity progressing through three stages, the
second being the religious stage after which humanity
progressed to the final stage of scientific thinking. 7 Those
who remained in the second stage were seen as ignorant or
'Hovenkamp, Science and Religion, pp. 22-56.
Sandeen, Roots of Fundamentalism , pp. 103-131; andMarsden, Fundamentalism , pp. 11-39, 102-23.
7Stanislav Andreski, ed.
, The Essential Comte; Selectedfrom Cours de Philosophie Posit.1v
,
trans. M. Clarke (New York-Barnes and Noble, 1974).
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obscurantists. The superstitions of religion were seen as
impeding the progress of science. Sensual experience provided
the only useful facts, and science alone was capable of
building knowledge from these facts. Since there was no
identifiable god in the modernist's system, there were no
theologians. Philosophers and scientists dealt with the
religious, moral and ethical implications of modernism.
Generally, the modernists were not without a religious
system, but it was completely derived from scientific
investigations of nature. As Barbour explained, modernists
identified God as:
An impersonal force.... In effect they 'deified' the
evolutionary process, making it the means of grace and
the source of progress. Human dignity, which had been
threatened by man's animal ancestry, was restored by
making man the forefront of an inevitable cosmic
advance to yet higher levels. 8
The modernist view of God was pantheistic. The concept
of God had meaning only in relation to mechanical processes.
As Haeckel wrote in his very popular account of modernist
beliefs:
When we pass over the finer shades and the variegated
clothing of the God-idea and confine our attention to
its chief element, we can distribute all the different
presentations of it in two groups - the theistic and
pantheistic group. The latter is closely connected
with the monistic, or rational, view of things, and
the former is associated with dualism and mysticism. 9
Barbour, Science and Religion , p. 7.
Ernst Haeckel, The Riddle of the Universe at the Clnap
of the—Nineteenth Century (New York: Harper & Brothers
Publishers, 1901), p. 276.
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The pantheistic "God-idea" was considered much more rational
and more in keeping with the thoughts and sentiments of an
"age of science."
Clearly, the modernist view of the role of God
represented an extreme position in American thought during the
years after Darwin and was certainly at the opposite end of
the spectrum in regard to Kuyperian thought. Kuyper's system
posited a transcendent God and emphasized the value of
theological thinking in the grand scheme of rationality.
Kuyper had nothing but contempt for the modernist's
philosophical system, believing that their philosophies
represented all that was evil and decadent in Christian
are.'
Kuyper feared modernism more than any other contemporary
system of thought because it was so appealing. He aimed much
of his rhetorical and persuasive efforts at this opponent.
It's appeal, he argued, came from the principles and world
view that supported modernism. These principles gave new life
to the natural tendencies of humanity to throw off the yoke
of theism, but until the development of evolutionism
unregenerate humanity did not have the means of doing so.
Abraham Kuyper, Evolution , trans. E.R. Post (Amsterdam:
Hovekkar and Wormser, 1899), pp. 4-9. This was a speech
delivered at the Free University of Amsterdam. It is perhaps
the clearest exposition on the theory of evolution delivered
by Kuyper.
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Kuyper wrote:
They languished spiritually in the diaspora of their
Ignorabimus. But thanks be to the theory of Evolution
they have now also come into possession of one all-
inclusive system, of a world-and-life-view deduced
from one principle. .. .Our adversaries are no longer
baffled by any of these questions [i.e. the origin of
the soul], and enthused by their new discovery most
of them look down even with pity if not with conceit
upon anyone who still clings to the old standpoint of
Christianity.
In other words, the modernists developed a world view, a
philosophy and a science logically constructed from one basic
and appealing anti-theistic principle.
This new independence offered to proponents of anti-
theism was severely criticized by Kuyper in his 1899 lecture
on evolution delivered at the Free University. It is not
coincidental that it was written shortly after Haeckel's
Riddle of the Univgrsp." m this lecture, Kuyper offered a
systematic critique of modernism using the tools of analysis
he used so well - principialism and antitheticalism. Kuyper
systematically listed many of the famous contemporary
modernists and critically analyzed their views.
The radical rejection of traditional concepts of God by
the modernists and their close philosophical proximity to the
Neo-Calvinists accounted for, in part, the radical nature of
Kuyper' s epistemology. When Kuyper posited the separation of
Kuyper, Evolution , pp. 2-3.
12 Haeckel or his philosophy were mentioned no fewer than
twenty-five times in less than 4 5 pages.
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humanity into two very real camps, he frequently used
modernists as illustrations. Haeckel, as was mentioned earlier
became the straw man in many of Kuyper's arguments. He
demonstrated, for example, that Haeckel established his system
not because of compelling scientific facts but because of
previously held, anti-theistlc principles. Due to the
rational, yet insidious nature of modernism, it appears Kuyper
felt justified in using extremes to drive home his point.
The only similarity between Kuyper's system and the
modernist's was philosophical kinship. Like Kuyper, modernists
developed a system of thought that emanated from one unifying
ideal. In the case of Haeckel, the atom provided the basis for
his monistic ideal. He believed that the current universe
could be explained and understood entirely in light of the
chemico-physical make-up of the atom. Everything, from the
structure of wood to the emotion of hate, could ultimately be
understood in the composition of the atom. Kuyper, too,
accepted the general idea of a unifying ideal, except that his
was the transcendent God of traditional Christianity. Kuyper's
ideal was supernatural while modernism's was natural. The
modernist and the Neo-Calvinists began from a similar
philosophical base, but arrived at radically different systems
of thought. This dichotomy provided evidence for Kuyper's
belief that principles, not facts, drove rationality and that
humanity was divided into two antithetical camps.
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Solutions to the problem of the relationship between
science and theology were much more subtle and diverse among
the liberal theologians. Like the modernists, liberal
theologians accepted the high status ascribed to science. But,
they rejected the modernist's naturalistic interpretation of
humanity for a view that postulated a significant and
important spiritual dimension in humanity. 13 Theology was the
study of this spiritual dimension. A harmonious relationship
between science and theology was envisioned by liberal
theologians. The nature of this harmonious relationship and
how it contrasts with the complementary model of the Christian
Reformed Church will be investigated.
On the surface, the complementary model and the model of
liberal theologians appeared similar. Conflict between science
and theology was rare in both models, unlike in the modernist
and traditionalist models. However, upon close examination,
harmony existed in liberal thinking to the degree that
theology paralleled and gave deference to science. There was
not the idea of being complementary in the liberal model of
interaction between science and theology. Theological
propositions were redefined and were not considered
epistemologically equal to scientific propositions. Theology
received status and honor to the degree that it adopted the
Frederick Gregory, "The Impact of Darwinian Evolution
on Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century," in God and
Nature eds. Lindberg and Numbers, pp. 378-383.
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methodology and assumptions of science.
Liberal theology retained the terminology of traditional
Christianity but redefined it in relation to its new focus -
humanity. Kant had removed knowledge of a transcendent God
from rationality, so liberal theology studied the effects of
God on humanity. Liberal theology studied an immanent God, a
God who was apprehended and known only in relation to
humanity. God was not transcendent and did not interject
himself into history. Therefore, liberal theology rejected
traditional Christian dogma, such as the deity of Christ,
miracles and the divine inspiration of Scriptures. Salvation
was seen within the context of the evolutionary progress.
Christ became an ideal that was analyzed and dissected and
used as a model of humanity triumphing over its baser nature.
While it was defined by human reason and scientific
knowledge, nevertheless, liberal theology reaffirmed the
strength of the spirit over nature. As humanity continued to
seek that which was honorable, good and moral by discovering
the "godness" within, it would rise above its animal nature
and usher in the "Kingdom of God" on earth. Human experience,
not divine revelation, became the means of knowing God.
Theological propositions only had validity and meaning
in relation to scientific or rational explanations. This
attests to the epistemological inequality of scientific and
theological propositions in the liberal model. Theology dealt
with spiritual matters which could not be apprehended in
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isolation. To speak of sin as a rupture between God and man
was meaningless. But to speak of sin as an "Inhumanity [that]
has fortified itself in the institutions of trade, society,
politics, and religion," gave the concept meaning and impetus
for social and institutional reform. 14 Theological
propositions, while important in defining the strengths and
weaknesses of humanity, were nevertheless epistemologically
inferior to scientific propositions.
Theology was viewed as broadly conforming to empirical
and rational methods because it limited itself to human
experience. 15 The rise of biblical scholarship illustrated
liberal willingness to conform to "scientific" standards. The
books of Moses, for example, were analyzed linguistically and
historically. The gospel accounts of Jesus were questioned
based on contextual and historical methods. Comparative
religion became a popular academic discipline and the lives
of biblical figures were carefully scrutinized with the latest
psychological and sociological tools. The focus of this
scientific theology was to understand the spiritual drive in
humanity. Jesus, Scripture and biblical characters were
important because they exhibited the spiritual qualities
necessary for humanity to progress to a higher plane. Yet,
14 George Gordon quoted in William R. Hutchison. The
Modernist Impulse in American Protestantism (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 191.
15 Ibid.
, pp. 87-94.
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scientific methodology and evolutionary assumptions provided
the key necessary for releasing those qualities.
Evolutionary thinking, with its ever-present emphasis on
progress, was seen as a natural ally of liberal theology. The
theory of evolution was rapidly and wholeheartedly embraced
by liberals. However, they preferred the more gentle
Lamarckian evolution over the Darwinian evolution favored by
the modernists. Lamarckian evolution emphasized an "innate
power" (pouvoir de la vie) that produced organisms of
increasing complexity and perfection. It also stressed an
"inner disposition" that assured the continuity of changes
produced by the environment. (This is the famous idea that
environmentally induced changes in the physiology of an animal
can be inherited) . 16 The idea of inner and innate forces meshed
well with the liberal concept of an immanent God. Therefore,
evolutionary theories regarding society, psychology, and
history were rapidly absorbed into liberal theology. In the
final analysis, since liberal theology rejected a transcendent
God, insisted on analyzing Scripture "scientifically," and
used many of the scientific conclusions of evolutionary
science, it was methodologically similar to science. Science
set the boundaries for theological investigation and provided
the analytical tools. God was defined by nature but unlike
the modernist, the liberals believed God to be separate from
Moore, Post-Darwinian Controversies
, pp. 142-43.
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nature.
While generalizations are dangerous when dealing with
such a diverse group as the liberal theologians, the model of
interaction between science and theology can be characterized
by harmony at the expense of theology's independence and
equality. Theology removed its focus from a transcendent God
to humanity's "godness". Theology accepted the epistemological
superiority of scientific knowledge and the methodology and
evolutionary assumptions of science. Theology and science were
not seen as equal partners, their relationship was not
complementary. Theology and science were harmonious to the
degree that theology was willing to accept the leadership of
science.
TRADITIONALISTS
The third major group of intellectuals to deal with the
problem of the relationship between theology and science were
the traditionalists. They were most like the Kuyperians in
their acceptance of conservative, Calvinist theology. They
accepted the transcendence of God and the reality of miracles.
Scripture was also believed to be divinely inspired and the
basis for all of life. However, the greatest difference
between the traditionalists and the Christian Reformed
intellectuals occurred in the area of epistemology,
specifically, what was considered to be the foundation of
knowledge.
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The Old Princeton, or Princeton Theology, school of
thought characterized the traditionalists. 17 Composed primarily
of Presbyterians, such as Charles Hodge (1797-1878)
, Archibald
Alexander (1772-1851), Benjamin B. Warfield (1851-1921) and
J. Gresham Machen (1881-1937), the traditionalists represented
the prominent thinking of nineteenth-century America. The Old
Princeton tradition emphasized confessional and doctrinal
Presbyterianism and employed the Common Sense Realism of
Thomas Reid and the empirical scientific methods of Francis
Bacon. The philosophical and scientific components of this
tradition ensured the dominance of a strong empirical and
realist outlook on the universe.
The Reidian school of thought was based on classical
foundational ism. Foundational ism postulated that a sure
structure for knowledge could only be based on a foundation
of indubitable certitudes. D. Z. Phillips, in his recent book
which compares the Kuyperian and foundationalist epistemic
systems, defined foundational ism as:
The view that propositions are of two kinds, those
which stand in need of evidence, and those which
provide the required evidence. The latter are said to
17 See John C. Vander Stelt, Philosophy and Scripture: A
Study in Old Princeton and Westminster Theology (Marlton,
N.J.: Mack Publishing Co., 1978); Bozeman, Protestants in an
Age of Science, pp. 32-43; and Mark Noll, ed.. The Princeton
Theology 1812-1921: Scripture. Science, and Theological Method
from Archibald Alexander to Benjamin Warfield (Grand Rapids:
Baker Book House, 1983) for more information on this school
of thought.
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be foundational, since they do not stand in need of
further evidence.
As with most philosophical system that stressed realism and
empiricism, Reid was interested in establishing a basis for
certainty to combat philosophical skepticism. 19
It is important to note that Reid, and the Old Princeton
theologians and philosophers, did not put the existence of God
in the class of foundational principles, unlike Kuyper and his
followers. Instead, it was generally asserted that by going
from foundational principles, which were considered
scientifically rational, one could prove that God existed. If
"there are, in fact, the clearest marks of design and wisdom
in the world of nature", argued Reid, then it must be
concluded that there was a wise and intelligent cause. 20 This
appeal to design characterized the major writings of
nineteenth-century Presbyterian writers and was the embodiment
of natural theology and the "argument from design."
The existence of God was something that had to be
demonstrated. The proposition was not a foundational principle
D. Z. Phillips, Faith After Foundationalism (London:
Routledge, 1988), p. xiii. Phillips actually refers to the
Kuyperian system of thought as "Reformed", but the
representatives he used were chiefly Neo-Calvinists.
19 Alan H. Goldman, Empirical Knowledge (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1988), pp. 1-15.
Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man ,
ed. Baruch A. Brody (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T Press, 1969)
VI:6, pp. 667-69 quoted in Marsden, "The Collapse of American
Evangelical Academia," p. 227.
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because it could not be classed as a non-inferential
certitude. Since it was not foundational, it had to be proved
using rational arguments or it would be condemned as an
irrational statement. God, while understood by the
traditionalists as being transcendent and infinite, was made
accessible by using finite reason. This was the crux of
Presbyterian apologetics and natural theology.
Presbyterian apologetics and natural theology assumed
that reasonable proof of God and his characteristics could be
derived from a rational analysis of nature. William Paley's
imminently popular book Natural Theology (1802) and the large
Bridoewater Treatises attested to the popularity of this view
of the relationship between God and nature. 21 Mark Hopkins
(1802-1887), Professor of Moral Philosophy and president of
William College, stated confidently that "If God has made a
revelation in one mode, it must coincide with what he has
revealed in another." 22 Assuming that nature could reveal
something of God, he went on with an argument from analogy.
There is a harmony of adaptation and also of analogy.
The key is adapted to the lock; the fin of the fish
21 William Paley, Natural theology; or. Evidences of the
Existence and Attributes of the Deity . 12th ed. (London:
Printed for J. Faulder, 1809); The Bridqewater Treatises were
commissioned in 1825 by the last will and testament of the 8th
Earl of Bridgewater, Francis Henry Egerton, to show "the
Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God as Manifested in Creation."
D.L. LeMahieu, The Mind of William Palev: A Philosopher and
His Age (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1976)
, p.
Mark Hopkins, Evidences of Christianity (Boston: T.R.
Marvin & Sons, 1880), p. 97.
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is analogous to the wing of the bird. Christianity,
as I hope to show, is adapted to man; it is analogous
to the other manifestations which God has made of
Natural theology assumed that by amassing facts in a Baconian
fashion and by applying rational thought shaped by common
sense foundational principles, one would be compelled to
accept the reality of God's character. In a very real sense,
natural theology postulated that knowledge of God was
subservient to human rationalism.
Natural theology functioned well in America until the
general intellectual community began to guestion the certitude
of the traditionalist's foundational principles. George
Marsden, in his essay entitled The Collapse of American
Evangelical Academia . provided an excellent account of this
erosion of unity. The principles held by the traditionalists
were challenged directly by the principles of the evolutionary
modernists, positivists and materialists. By the turn of the
century, very few of the traditionalist's principles survived
among the intelligentsia as common sense propositions. Even
such basic ideas as truth, objectivity of facts, and an
orderly and intelligible universe were replaced by such
principles as evolutionary process, subjectivity and
uncertainty. As a result, Marsden concluded, evangelical
academia suffered a major setback in the early decades of the
23 Ibid., p. 75.
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twentieth century because the foundation upon which its entire
epistemological house was built lost credibility. 24 But more
importantly, the proposition 'God exists, and other
theological propositions, were relegated to the class of
irrational statements by many in America because
foundational ist thinkers failed to prove them by rational
means
.
Kuyperians did not quarrel with the traditionalists over
the reality of foundational principles, they quarreled over
what was included in the foundation and why it was included.
Nicholas Wolterstorff
,
philosopher and strong advocate of
Kuyperianism, updated Kuyper's philosophy as well as refuted
foundationalism in a short, concise essay entitled Reason
Within the Bounds of Religion (1976)
.
25 He observed correctly
that foundationalists were repulsed by the idea of including
God in the foundation because that proposition appeared
refutable. The goal of the foundationalists, Wolterstorff
insisted:
Is to form a body of theories from which all
prejudice, bias, and unjustified conjecture have been
eliminated. To attain this, we must begin with a firm
foundation of certitude and build the house of theory
on it by^methods of whose reliability we are equally
Marsden, "Collapse," pp. 245-247.
25 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason Within the Bounds of
Religion (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1976).
26 Ibid, p. 24.
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This goal could not be realized, foundationalists argued, if
the principle 'God exists' was a foundational principle.
Wolterstorff proceeded to show the bankruptcy of
classical foundational ism by demonstrating that
foundationalists had no basis for believing that first
principles must be derived from human reasoning. He began by
arguing that the foundationalists said a theory may be
accepted if it can be justified by some foundational
principle. 27 To be justified, noted Wolterstorff, referred to
the type of relation a theory bears to the foundational
principles. The classic view has been deduction. But
Wolterstorff pointed out that deductivism had collapsed
because "many theories which seem warranted of acceptance are
not deducible from any foundation." 28
Probabilism arose in the nineteenth century to carry the
foundational ist's banner. This was an inductivist argument
that stated that a theory belonged to genuine science if it
was probable with respect to foundational knowledge.
Inductivists argued in terms of degrees of certainty. For
example, the inductivist would claim that it was probable man
evolved from apes because of genotypical and phenotypical
similarities. But, Wolterstorff said, the basis of uniformity
needed to make even probabilistic statements acceptable was
27 Ibid., p. 32.
28 Ibid., p. 33.
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lacking. This assumption of uniformity was itself induced and
was, therefore, not part of the foundation.
But that would be to offer an inductive argument —
an inductive argument to justify the very principle
we need to justify an inductive argument. In short,
we are still in the situation that David Hume was in.
We lack a justification for induction. 29
Probabilism, Wolterstorff concluded, also failed to provide
the justification for the foundationalist's principles.
The third, and last, attempt by foundational ists to save
their theory of justification can be found in Karl Popper's
falsification theory. 30 The falsification theory is best stated
in the negative. If a theory contradicts the foundational
principles, then sufficient justification can be given to
reject the theory. The problem with falsification,
Wolterstorff claimed, was that rejection was rare because
endless modifications could be made to a theory. 31
Wolterstorff concluded by claiming that no one has been
able to demonstrate that theories are justified by
foundational principles. Deduction, induction and
falsification from foundational principles do not justify
accepting or rejecting theories. The foundational ists,
Wolterstorff claimed, have been wrong to insist that
29 Ibid., p. 36.
30 Popper, Logic; and R. N. Ackerman, The Philosophy of
Karl—Popper (Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts
Press, 1976) .
31 Wolterstorff, Reason , pp. 38-41.
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foundational principles must be rational and objective. This
is a legacy, said Wolterstorff , that has consistently confused
and intimidated scientists intent on honoring their Christian
commitment. "Only if the sting of foundational ism is plucked
will the infection subside." 32
After his critique of foundationalism, Wolterstorff
advanced his theory of how theories are justified. While his
philosophizing is non-historical with few references to his
Neo-Calvinist past, the ties are apparent upon close
examination. Since the criteria that foundational principles
must be rational was shown to be arbitrary, Wolterstorff
contended:
That the religious beliefs of the Christian scholar
ought to function as control beliefs within his
devising and weighing of theories.
. . .Their functioning
as control beliefs is absolutely central to the work
of the Christian scholar. 33
In other words, in true Kuyperian fashion, he insisted that
the foundational principles should be religiously based. These
principles are not to be derived from rational argumentation
but from the subjectiveness of a persons religious world view.
That is also why the title of Wolterstorff 's book is so
significant. Reason Within the Bounds of Religion stressed the
Kuyperian relationship between human rationality and Christian
principles. Reason is influenced by the religious principles
32 Ibid., p. 30.
33 Ibid., p. 66.
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that are a part of each person.
Christian foundationalists were seen by Kuyperians as
hostages to a system of thought that did great damage to
Christianity. To Kuyperians the omission of the existence of
God from the foundational principles was a travesty. To make
God the object of a philosophical or scientific proposition
was to reject his sovereignty. Cornelius Van Til had this to
say about the foundationalist 's tendency to make God the
conclusion of an argument.
To ask whether the tribune God of Scripture exists and
whether the space-time world is what it is because of
this God, is to presuppose that abstract possibility
is back of God. A God of whom it is possible to ask
intelligently whether he exists is not the God of
Scripture. .. .It is an insult to this God to argue for
his possible existence. 34
D. Z. Phillips put it succinctly when he said:
We are asked to accept as the only appropriate
philosophical method for establishing the rationality
of religious belief, a method which actually distorts
the character [God] of religious belief. 35
Modernists and traditionalists were essentially cut from
the same philosophical cloth. Both groups relied heavily on
foundationalism. Science, to the Christian foundationalists,
was very important for deriving theological propositions.
While all the conservative Presbyterian thinkers, such as
34 Cornelius Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge
(New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1969)
p. 263. '
35 Phillips, Faith , p. 12.
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Warfield, Hodge and Machen, accepted the efficacy of the Holy
Spirit and the divine origin of Scripture, they still sought
justification from reason and empirical science for these
propositions. For the foundational ists who were modernists,
science was used to refute the claims made by Christian
foundational ists. For example, orderliness and design did not
indicate the presence of a Creator but rather the presence of
process and change.
The battle between traditionalists and modernists
accounts for, in part, the vehemence surrounding the
scientific debate regarding evolution. Each group of
intellectuals viewed the relationship between science and
theology differently. The modernists saw no relationship,
because theology was a vestige of the primitive second stage
of human development. God was only a force in nature that
directed the evolutionary process. Knowledge obtained from
science was the only rational and reasonable knowledge worth
acquiring. The traditionalists, on the other hand, believed
that theological truths could be derived from science. God
was more than a force in nature, God was the end of any
rational argument pursued by any right-thinking individual.
Traditionalists believed that rational proof, proof that any
rational person would be compelled to accept, could be
presented for many theological propositions. The validity of
theological propositions was dependent on a consensus in the
intellectual community. And, as Marsden pointed out,
137
conservative traditionalists were thrown into disarray when
the principles they believed were rational first principles
were discarded for principles more in keeping with modernist
thinking.
It is significant that none of the three models of
interaction gave to theology a place of prominence equal to
that offered by the Kuyperian model. The modernists and
traditionalists were enamored with the certainty and strength
of human reasoning and scientific methodology. Liberal
theologians understood Kantian philosophy to say that
theological propositions could never be known with the same
degree of certainty as scientific propositions, so theological
propositions became subjective and outside the realm of
reason. The complementary model accepted the certainty of
human reasoning but put along side it the certainity of faith
and inspiration.
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CONCLUSION
The Christian Reformed Church was able internally to
withstand many of the changes that caused strife and confusion
in theologically conservative Christian circles in the early
twentieth century in America because of Kuyper's Neo-Calvinist
philosophy and the complementary model of interaction between
science and theology. It could be argued that the status quo
is not always advantageous and that change is preferable to
stagnation. But, conservative Protestant theology suffered
severe setbacks during the years 1900 to 1930, while the
theology of the Christian Reformed Church suffered little. In
fact, the denomination emerged from this period stronger than
when it entered the twentieth century. It possessed a definite
view of the role and function of both theology and science.
Theology and the sciences were both human endeavors which
sought to understand the cosmos. The Kuyperian idea that they
were separate but equally important was essential for this
balanced view. Neither discipline was seen as more important
but the concept of the "organism of science" and Kuyper's
reliance on principles ensured that all disciplines would be
viewed as parts of a whole. The leadership of the Christian
Reformed Church possessed a philosophical system that gave
them assurance and strength in times of trouble.
The philosophical position of the Christian Reformed
Church resulted in three attitudes that encouraged stability
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and unity. First, conflict and compromise between science and
theology were minimized. Secondly, science and theology were
given freedom to grow and mature. And, thirdly, the very
presence of a unifying philosophical system provided an anchor
during those troubling decades.
Conflict between science and theology was virtually
eliminated by removing the conflict to the realm of principles
and world views. The world of facts, in which both science and
theology operated, was one large, unified body created by God.
It was logically impossible for a fact of science to
contradict a fact of theology. There was no fear that science
would suddenly discover something that caused one to abandon
the faith. When conflict arose, the explanation was sought
elsewhere than in the world of facts. The source of the
conflict was sought within the hearts and minds of humans.
Conflict was seen as the product of sin. First, a
scientist could observe incorrectly, use faulty reasoning or
succumb to a bias. All these human errors could explain why
scientific observations seem to contradict theological
propositions. However, if human error was ruled out and
conflict still existed, the source of the conflict was found
in the principles and world views held. Principial analysis
became the key to understanding ultimate conflicts.
Principial analysis was motivated by the antithesis.
Since there were really only two sets of principles, those
that glorified God and those that glorified humanity,
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discovering which set motivated a particular response to facts
was often straight-forward. The heart and motives of the
individual were investigated, not the objective world of
facts. Principial analysis was an attempt to understand why
opposing theories existed for the same group of facts. The
Kuyperians employed this tool to diffuse the tension between
theology and science.
While conflict was minimized by principial analysis,
sphere sovereignty eliminated the need for compromise between
science and theology. The sphere of theology was a complete
unity in and of itself as were the spheres of politics and art
and science. These spheres came together only in the sense
that they were parts of God's creation and assisted in adding
pieces to the organism of Truth. Theology was to keep itself
from being entangled in the sphere of science and vice versa.
Theology was not forced to compromise with the findings of
science. They were both to glorify God but theology was under
no obligation to use scientific methodology or adopt
scientific conclusions.
The absence of conflict and compromise were particularly
important for the conservative theology of the denomination.
Theological propositions, which were unashamedly unscientific,
were accepted without excuse or apology. Science, in the
Christian Reformed Church supported and encouraged the claims
of theology. Theology occupied the place of prominence it held
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in seventeenth-century Calvinist thinking, but with one major
difference — science, too, was highly esteemed.
Due to the lack of conflict and compromise, both science
and theology were given the freedom to explore, to grow, and
to mature. Retrenchment, or the presence of a "fortress
mentality," was absent in Christian Reformed thinking. A
balanced view of science and scientific discoveries resulted
from this attitude. The negative fundamentalist response to
science was condemned by Christian Reformed intellectuals.
Scientists were not vilified as atheists or pseudo-
intellectuals. As a result, the general anti-intellectualism
that was prevalent in much of theologically conservative
Christianity from the 1920' s to the late 1940' s was avoided
by the Christian Reformed Church.
Finally, the very presence of a unified philosophical
system provided stability and cohesiveness during this stormy
period in American religious history. Regardless of how the
system was received outside Christian Reformed enclaves,
internally it provided a coherent world view and answers to
troubling questions. Kuyper's philosophy helped church leaders
explain the nature of knowledge, the substance of Truth, the
role of facts, the role of principles and the importance of
the subjective. Their system of thought provided adequate
defense against the encroachments of theological liberalism
and scientific positivism.
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Historically, theology and science have had much in
common. Theology and science ask the two most important
questions asked by humanity: "Why?" and "How?". To ask either
question without the other, is to receive an incomplete or
biased answer. But that is not to say that science should ask
"why?". Science, and rightly so, should avoid teleological and
theological answers. Theology, on the other hand, should
avoid answering questions that are better left to the
scientist. Science and theology should be encouraged, however,
to freely share the answers to their respective questions. Not
only to share answers, but to integrate these answers into a
unified position. The complementary model of the Christian
Reformed Church was an attempt at integration of the knowledge
obtained by science and theology.
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The years from 1880 to 1930 were turbulent years in
Protestant American history. By the end of the nineteenth
century, theology lost its status as the "queen of the
sciences" and the sciences (those that were empirically based)
gained status and prestige to the point that the nineteenth
century has been called the "age of science". A key to the
turmoil in Protestant religion in American can be found in the
study of the interaction between science and theology.
This study seeks to understand the origin, nature and
implications of the Christian Reformed model of interaction
between science and theology, called the complementary model.
Complementarity implies an equality among the parts that
comprise the whole and a great degree of harmony but
independence among the parts. It is the contention of this
thesis that the complementary model aided the church's
intellectuals in maintaining conservative theological thinking
as well as accepting much of modern scientific thought.
Further, the model represented a view that was different from
the major models of the period; the models of the
traditionalists, theological liberals and modernists. T o
provide the context for a discussion of the Christian Reformed
model, an understanding of certain general characteristics of
the denomination and the ethnic group that made up the
denomination is needed. Chapter 1 investigates the
homogeneity, philosophical disposition and religious
tendencies of the denomination. Homogeneity was a result of
the denominations close association with a small ethnic group
of Dutch-Americans. Philosophically this homogenous group
favored the speculative, system-building, idealistic
philosophies of Germany. They were suspicious of the
empiricism and realism of the British. This philosophical
disposition put them at odds with the Baconianism and Common
Sense Realism so prevalent in American thinking. Finally,
their religious system was evangelical but not
fundamental istic
.
Chapter two investigates the philosophical influence of
Abraham Kuyper, Dutch theologian and statesman, in the
construction of the complementary model. Kuyper 's
philosophical system became known as Neo-Calvinism. The
distinctiveness of this system was the synthesis of
Reformation (Calvinist) principles into a Kantian
philosophical structure. This synthesis resulted in the
significant proposition that both theological and empirical
knowledge were subjective and, therefore, epistemologically
equal.
A detailed examination of the structure of the
complementary model is undertaken in Chapter three.
Elaboration on Kuyper's epistemological equality, sphere
sovereignty and principialism represent the key elements of
the model. Epistemological equality provided the philosophical
justification for the model. Sphere sovereignty provided the
functional means whereby science and theology were kept
separate. Finally, principialism provided the justification
for harmony between science and theology as well as the
explanation for the reality of disharmony.
Finally, chapter four investigates the traditionalist,
modernist, and liberal models of interaction. The chapter
examines how they differed from the Christian Reformed model
and how they were similar.
The complementary model aided in minimizing conflict and
compromise between science and theology in the Christian
Reformed Church. Science and theology were also given freedom
to grow and mature independently. Finally, the presence of a
unifying philosophical position provided stability during
those turbulent decades in American religious history.
